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GOODFELLOW**

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BOX NO. 7

69085-B10.031.04.A

FP

1941-1944, undated
Operation Jedburgh
3-B-8-3-6
1945
1944
1944

1844

There is no one OSS man in charge both SEAC and CBI OSS units. SEAC and CBI are considered separate and distinct theaters by OSS, and each has its own OSS commander. To combine the two theaters under one head is not considered advisable, as the British would strongly object to such an arrangement and it is believed might even close out OSS 404 altogether.

(f) Lt. Colonel BERNO is on detached service to the OSS administrative office in CBI HQ from HQ, OSS 404. He coordinates supply and administrative matters for all OSS units in both SEAC and CBI. As HEPPNER'S representative, he exercises administrative and disciplinary control over HEPPNER'S men on detached service at CBI, HQ, but has no such control over COUGHLIN'S men stationed there. This situation could and should be corrected by the establishment of a definite SOS HQ at CBI HQ for all OSS units.

(g) OSS personnel on duty in CALCUTTA are under CBI, and are therefore under COUGHLIN's command. Some of HEPPNER's men have been placed there on detached service, and attached to COUGHLIN'S command for duty.

/s/ F. B. HAYNE,
Col. Inf.
Asst. C of S G-2 CBI

COPIA degli appunti consegnati al Tenente CALLAMAN.

Sono stati ritoccati soltanto alcuni numeri per aggiornamento.

COMPILATI dal Comando Supremo(Maresciallo Giovanni MESSE)

Approved for Release
2005/05/03: HA-GOODFELLOW-3-B-7-10-9

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4 May 1944.

The Italian Military Situation

The Armistice was asked by the Italians for two reasons:
1) a universal feeling of weariness after three years of war outside the country;
2) difficiency of resources in the country.

After the Armistice, there was active fighting by the Italian troops around Rome, in Corsica and Sardinia, in Cephalonia and Corfu, as well as in the Aegean islands. But there ensued a period of national confusion during which the Italians made no great progress is military cooperation with the United Nations, although Italian soldiers were drafted in large numbers and used as laborers.

The Italian people who had welcomed the Allies as liberators, suffered many disappointments. Public and charitable institutions were requisitioned in great numbers. Valuable furniture and documents were used by the Allied forces as fuel for heating, which enraged the population. Private automobiles were requisitioned almost without exception. The buying of supplies by the military, with the lira at 100 to the dollar, stripped the country of all surpluses.

AMGOT paralyzed civil and economic activity in the liberated zone in Italy, and its interference in the administration of justice by the Italians themselves was resented. In spite of all difficulties, however, Italian military authorities did organize a battalion which was fighting beside Allied troops in December 1943. There are now 15 battalions of a total of 20,000 men. It is the intention of the Italian army authorities to provide complete engineer and auxiliary services of 100,000 trained men, and another 100,000 for other services.

The participation of the Italians in combatting the Germans has been limited by the Allied Command to 14,000 men, which from the Italian point of view is many fewer than can be supplied in the common cause.

The offensive strength of the Italian Navy and Air Forces has steadily increased. 250 airplanes have been operating with the Allies since September 1943.

It is a source of annoyance that no change of status has been allowed in the case of Italian prisoners of war captured before the time of the Armistice. Resentment is felt at the treatment given Italian prisoners in the hands of the French and at the handing over of Italian prisoners captured by the British and Americans to the French. A redefinition of the status of Italian prisoners of war is urgently needed. Arming these men for combat is an easy solution. The example of the "Cuneo" Division, now serving in the Near East, is the best proof of this contention.

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MEMORANDUM

8 April 1944

TO: Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

SUBJECT: OSS Special Items

Attached hereto, for your information, is a tabulation showing the procurement status of OSS Special Items as of 1 April 1944.

Also attached are two lists of all new items put into production by the Army and the Army Air Forces as of the date shown on the lists. Similar lists will be sent you each month with the tabulation of OSS Special Items.

C. M. Sears, Jr.

C. M. Sears, Jr.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Services

Attachments

CMSJr/jlh

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PROCUREMENT STATUS OF OSS SPECIAL ITEMS

1 April 1944

Paper Parachute
A small paper device for dropping packages of 25 lbs. Commercial item. Can obtain promptly.

Turtle Egg
Available from stock.

Thermit Well
Available from stock.

Altimeter Switch
Available from stock.

Cap, blasting
Available from stock.

Clams
Available from stock.

Delay Mechanism, Clockwork
Available from stock.

Diving Equipment
Sixty-day delivery.

Equipment, lockpicking
Available from stock

Firing Device, delay type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, pressure type
Mechanical difficulty developed with original design. This has been modified and new design will be available 15 April.

Firing Device, pull type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, release type
Available from stock.

Fog Signal
Specifications not finalized and do not expect production before 1 May.

Fuse Igniter, pull wire
Available from stock.

Incendiaries, pocket time
Available from stock

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Limpets
Available from stock.

Magazine Caps
Available from stock,

Magnetic Holdfasts
Available 15 April.

Magnet
Available from stock.

Silenced Pistol
Available from stock.

Switch, road
Available from British SOE

Torch
Standard commercial item

Booby trap wire
For use with booby traps. 20,000 spools on hand.

Tablets "K"
Knock-out drops. Demand negligible. Can supply.

Tablets "L"
Plan to procure 1,000 in U.S. Available 15 May.

Tablets, Benzedrine
Available. Small stock on hand.

Kit, Medical, Universal
On hand.

Gun, stinger
Available from stock.

Knives, fighting
Available.

Bags, lefoten
Intend to use standard Army item. When ordering specify - "Bag, clothing, waterproof."

Cosh, spring
Collapsible club. 5,000 on hand

Smatchets
Modified cleaver. 4,000 on hand.

Climbers, tree
Using standard QMC climber.

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Compound, cap sealing
Standard commercial item.

Fireflies
Now in production. Should have complete stock by 20 April.

Firefly, large
A delay type incendiary for use on tank cars. 500 under procurement. Will be available about 15 May.

Press X
Available from stock.

Photostat, Zeller, Portable
Available from stock 20 April.

Dog Drag
Available from stock.

Match Box Camera
A small camera the size of a match box. Does better work than Minox. 500 under procurement and stock will be available about 1 May.

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N E W   I T E M S   1 April 1944

A R M Y   S U P P L Y   P R O G R A M

Service	Stock or Model No.	Item	Unit
5	T44	Launcher, rocket, 4.5" (120 tube) (Dukw & LVT)	each
5	T45	Launcher, rocket, automatic 4.5" (12 Rd) (Armd LVT)	each
5	T91E3	Mount, Machine Gun, cal..50 A.A.	each
5	T3	Charge, Shaped	each
5	T37	Rocket, HE, 7.2" (w/f)	each
5	T44	Rocket, inert, 7.2"	each
5	T19	Shell, Smoke, WP, 105mm (w/f)(Mortar)	each
5	T28	Shell, Smoke, WP, 155mm (w/f)(Mortar)	each
7	AN/MPG-1	Radar Set	each
7	BD-89	Switchboard: 37 Common battery line, 20 magnetic line for use with TC-2	each
7	CY-64U	Chest, Spare parts chest required to provide units including mobile repair sections a means to carry repair parts furnished for 3rd Echelon Repairs	each
7	RL-39-A	Reel Unit-A steel, hand reel for use with light field wire.	each
7	R-62()/PR	Radio Receiver	each
7	PP-68	Vibrator Power Pack()/U Vibrator power supply for tube tester I-56-(); allows operation of tube tester from 6 or 12 V. DC.	each
7	PE-173	Power Unit	each
3		Saw, Chain, Portable, Gasoline Engine Driven, 24-inch Blade, Mule Pack	each
3		Truck, chassis, 6-Ton, 6x6, 220-inch wheelbase, 22-ft. from Rear of Cab to end of frame (for oil well cementing equipment)	each
3		Truck, chassis, 6-Ton, 6x6, 220-inch wheelbase, 18-ft. from back of cab to end of frame (for well-rig mounting)	each
3		Trailer, Low Bed, 8 to 10-T, 135-inch wheelbase, flat top, 94-inches wide, 20 to 22-ft. bed (Special oil field type)	each
2		Mount, L.C., 4.2" Chemical Mortar	each
2	M10A1	Canister, service	each
4	9959105	Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$-Ton, 6x6, Surgical, Operating	each
6		Shoes, Safety, Composition, Sole	pair
6		Pump, Gasoline Dispensing, Portable, 100 g.p.m. Capacity	each

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ARMY AIR FORCES

New Items to

29 FEB 1944

Service	Stock or Model No.	Item	Cost	Unit
1	AN/AIC-2	Interphone Equipment	$ 200	each
1	AN/AIC-2	Interphone Equipment less Jack Box BC-1366	120	each
1	AN/CRR-1	Radio Receiving Equipment	45	each
1	AN/APT-5(XA)	Radar Set	1,980	each
1	AN/ARA-3(XA)	Modulator Assembly	550	each
1	AN/APM-37	Radar Test Set	5,000	each
1	TS-61/AP	Echo Boxes, Hand-tuned	165	each
1	TS-89/AP	Voltage Divider	250	each
1	66 ACO/66 AFJ	Beacon, YH, (Radar) Navy Type, including complete Antenna Equipment, Steering Wheel Type	1,600	each
1	DAS-1	"Loran" Receiver, Navy Type	3,000	each
1	ME-78	Plotting Equipment	30	each
1	AN/CRN	Radio Range, Air Transportable (Non Standard)	3,000	each
1	AN/CRN-4	Radio Homing Beacon	440	each
1	TS-X/CRN-4	Test Set	1,007	each
1	PE-98	Dynamotor	666	each
1	P-8212	Kit, Antenna, Galvin Type to include Coupling Unit for SCR-609	198	each
1	409-M-5	Rectifier Collins (Non-standard)	206	each
1		Radio Transmitter, Meisner, Phone and CW, 1.5-12.5 mc, Master oscillator controlled, 150-watt	2,185	each
1	AN/TIQ-3	Public Address Set	3,000	each
1	RX-12	Facsimile Recorder (non-standard)	2,000	each
1	X-66033	Information Center, Air Transportable	14,949	each
1		Perforator, Teletype, Wheatstone	597	each
1		Radio Adapter Details	666	

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR 7 MEN FOR 6 MONTHS.

I SURGICAL

DESCRIPTION	SIZE	QUANTITY	REMARKS
Needles, Taper Point	16 & 18	1 pk each	
" , Cutting Edge	0, 7, 9	1 pk each	
Knives, Operating	3 & 4	# 3 Knife uses Blades # 4 " " "	# 10,11,12,15 # 20,21,22,23
Blades, Detachable	10,11,20,23	Bard Parker Co.	
Forceps, Tissue, med	med.	1	Laboratory type
" , Haemostatic	assorted	3	medium to large
" , Mosquito		4	Light
" , Bullet		1	Labratory type
" , "		1	Haemostatic type
Scissors, Bandage		2	
" , Double-sharp		2	
Probe, Bullet		2	1 - 6", 1 - 8"
Thermometers, Clinical		3	
Suture, Catgut, Plain	1	12	Sterile, in excess of 216"
" , " , "	2	3	" , " " " 54"
" , Silk, Dermal	000 (medium)	10 Strands	190" each
" , " , "	0 (coarse)	12 "	40" " approx.
Gloves, Rubber	$7\frac{1}{2}$	4 Prs.	
" , "	8	4 Prs.	

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DESCRIPTION	SIZE	QUANTITY	REMARKS
Droppers, Medicine	Stand.	12	
Cup, Eye	"	2	
Syringe, Fountain	"	1	
Rectal Tip	"	1	
Syringe, Asepto	½ oz.	1	For Wounds
"	3 " .	1	" "
" , Hypodermic	2 cc.	2	Yale Luer-Lok
" , "	5 cc.	1	" " "
N eedles, Luer Syringe	25 ga.	12	Erusto
Trays, Clinica l		2	
Bottle, Hot Water		1	
Tourniquet		1	
Plaster, Adhesive	1"	30 yds	
" , "	2"	30 "	
Bandages, "	1" X 3"	100	Band-Aid
" , Cotton	3"	22 "	
" , Elastic	4"	1	

II MEDICINAL

DESCRIPTION	SIZE	QUANTITY	REMARKS
Mercury, Bichl.	7.3 grs.	100 tabs.	Antiseptic 1 tab : 1 pt H20
Sulphanilamide (powder)	4 gm. Ampoules	12 Amps.	For open Wounds
Strichnine	1/30 gr.	100 tabs.	For Heart Stimulant. 1 : 8 hrs. Do not give persons 10 tabs, dogs 5.

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DESCRIPTION	SIZE	Quantity	REMARKS
Benzedrine	5 mg.	100 tabs	Gives very rapid boost. Strong Reaction.
Sulphanilamide	5 grs.	100 "	
Sulfathiazole	7.7 " .	300 "	For Gonorrhea .5 gm every 6 hrs until cured or for not more than 10 days.
Sulphapyridine	5 " .	100 "	Spec. for pneumonia 4 at once, 2 each 6 hrs. Plenty of w ater for patient.
Sulfadiazine			Recommendedby Drs.Shattuckaand Sharpless as safest of Sulfa drugs
Chiniofon	4 " .	50 "	Not enough. 3 three times daily for 1 wk. Chiniofon & Carbarsone spec.Amebic Dys.
Carbarsone	.25 gm.	40 caps.	Not enough. .25 gm twice daily for 10 days. After 10 day interval repeat.
Halazone	.004 gm.	1000 tabs.	Contaminated water. See"Handbook Of Health"
Entoral		60 caps.	Cold Preventive
Pot.Permang.	5 grs.	100 tabs.	Antiseptic. Do not use internally
Quinine	5 " .	1000 caps.	Prophylaxis. 10-15 grs.per wk. Dosage: 30 grs.daily for 7 - 10 days. Malaria.
Atabrine	.1 gm.	100 tabs.	Dosage:.1gm tab. three times daily after meals. Malaria.
Crystoids		30 pills	For intestinal worms. 5 pills in 1 dose.
P.A.C.Compound		1000 tabs.	Colds, grippe,etc.
Poultice, Dental		36	Relief of dental irritation.
Amertan		1 lb.	Abrasions, burns, haemorrhoids.
Diothane Ointment	1 %	1 Tube	Sensitive skin and mucous membrane.
Mercury Yellow Ox.	1 %	6 Tubes	Inflamed eyelids.
Nupercainol		3 ozs.	Haemorrhoids,mucous irritations.
Butyn Sulphate	2 %	.75 oz.	For eye or other mucous operations.
Pontocaine	½ %	½ " .	For surface anaesthesia in opthalmology.

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Description	Size	Quantity	
Adrenolin	1 cc	12 Amps.	Heart stimulant. Inject arm. Mt.sickness. Pneumonia at high elevations.
Codeine Sulfate	½ gr	50 tabs	Oral. 1 tab every 4 hours
Morphine Sulfate (Hypo)	¼ gr	100 "	1 Hypo every 4 hrs in 1 cc H20
Novocain-Suprarenin	2 cc	10 Amps	Inject as deep as useful for cut or break.
Ether	¼ lb	6 Cans	Anaesthetic dripped slowly into cone with gauze filler until patient is out. Repeat if patient becomes restless.
VitaminABDOL	Stand.	500 Tabs	1 every day if the diet is not balanced.

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CHINA - BURMA - INDIA

DATA

Lt. General Stilwell commands all American service personnel in China, Burma and India. In no place is he Supreme Commander, however; in China he is Deputy to Chiang Kai Shek; in Burma and India he is Deputy to Mountbatten. Actually he spends his time at Combat Hq in North Burma, directing the Chinese-American campaign there. General HQ, CBI, is now at New Delhi, having been quietly moved from Chungking, and is headed by Major General Sultan, Deputy to General Stilwell, and the real administrative commander of all American personnel in CBI. A Forward Echelon, CBI has been left in Chungking, but is of relatively little importance. British GHQ, India is at New Delhi, but troops participating in the Imphal-Kohima fighting are under the command of Lt. Gen. Slim, who reports directly to Mountbatten.

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander, SEAC, has his HQ at Kandy, Ceylon, with Major General Wedemeyer, USA, as his Deputy Chief of Staff and several other American officers in staff positions. Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill represents General Stilwell (and General Sultan) in Kandy in a liaison capacity. SEAC territory includes Sumatra but not Java; Burma and probably Thailand; no one seems to know the status of French Indo-China. The 10th Air Firce under Major General Davidson has its HQ at Tingkok, North Burma, and operates in Burma; it is part of the Eastern Air Command, a part of the SEAC organization, under Major

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General Stratemeyer at Calcutta. The 14th Air Force under Major General Chennault in China theoretically comes under over-all command of Stilwell, as Commanding General, USAF, CBI; the 20th Bomber Command reports directly to General Arnold, in Washington.

The Theater command organization is a complex one; the OSS organization is almost equally complex. It may be outlined as follows: Working units are located in

Ceylon	- Detachment 404		- Colonel Heppner CO
North Burma	- Detachment 101	)	
Kweilin	- AGFTRS	)	- Colonel Coughlin CO
Cungking	- SACO	)	

Liaison units are maintained at New Delhi (HQ, CBI) and Shadazup, Burma (Combat HQ); a general service unit is maintained at Calcutta; and a HQ and R&A unit is located at Kunming.

Detachment 101 is organized on unit rather than OSS lines. The original group was composed solely of officers sent out by SO, and they developed their work as an integrated shole. The work can be summed up briefly as (a) SI and OG work in support of General Stilwell's Burma Campaign and (B) carried out almost entirely with natives, locally recruited, trained, and operated in the field. Lt. Col. Peers as commanding officer spends a good portion of his time traveling between Mazira, Shadazup, Ceylon, New Delhi, etc. The results obtained by 101 have been extraorginarily good and valuable, due in a large part to their skill-

ful handling of the natives. This is freely recognized by General Stilwell, and Lt. Col. Stilwell, his G-2, stated flatly to me at Shadazup that General Stilwell could not have waged his Burma campaign without 101.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 May 1944.

THE ITALIAN MILITARY SITUATION

This essay on the present Italian military situation arises from a desire to give the picture of an accomplished fact, the picture in summary form in which the army found itself at the time of the Armistice and in the period following.

In our case the decision to conclude the Armistice with the United Nations was founded on the desire of the entire country to put an end to a war which was not wanted, not felt, and definitely contrary to the supreme national interest, far removed from the reality and ignoring the fact that many of our units on the peninsula were in September, ill-equipped, specially as to clothing, arms and equipment (materiel).

Three years of war conducted overseas and at a distance, had consumed all of our scarce resources and our deficiencies were not suitably compensated by Germany, and this aid was always tardy in arriving and always limited to that which was direly and urgently needed.

An English newspaper, on the day of the Armistice, justly revealed that while Germany on July 25 had automatically become an enemy of Italy, England and her allies had from that moment automatically become Italy's potential allies.

In the period from 25 July to the 8th of September there ran through our country a tragic feeling enhanced by the evident German preparations against us (forced by the demission of the fascists from power) caused by the internal disorder provoked by the just agitation of the people for the ending of hostilities, but not consciously aware of the secure German reaction and of their need for taking precautionary measures against it, and of the Allied demands for "unconditional surrender". A situation which demonstrates clearly how the possibility of activating the military clause of the Armistice immediately was difficult, although the Italians acted in good faith, because it depended on the pre-ordained German reaction largely put in force and in position to influence the Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the Italian desire to keep on fighting in the first days following the Armistice was apparent and demonstrated in the first combats around Rome, and the actions of their troops in Corsica and Sardinia, their desire to fight and throw out the German troops from those islands and areas, and in the desperate and heroic resistance in the islands of Cephalonia and Corfu, of the successful and sustained fight of the Cuneo division in aiding the English troops in the Aegean islands, of the Pinerolo Division in Greece, the Perugia and Firenze divisions in Albania, the Marche, Emilia, Venezia and Taurinense divisions in Herzegovina province, and Catarro in Montenegro.

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The Italian Government and government authorities resolved quickly and immediately to name the units which would operate against the common German enemy. But we were operating under difficulties which we were incapable of overcoming.

As for the conditions of the Armistice becoming a natural epilogue of military confusion, it actually resulted in practice of a severe harshness, although it did not affect the Italians' desire to continue the anti-German fight. That need, basically coincided with the Allied military interest and for this reason should be considered as a mitigating factor in the application of the Armistice clause, although Allied political necessity imposed that these conditions be hard.

Conversely, not only was that the case, but much of Italian armament and equipment which was available in liberated Italy, was inexorably blocked or in large part being used by other services, and while in the warehouses of Sicily there existed notable quantities of clothing items, the Italian soldiers were often lightly clothed and almost had to walk barefooted.

In Corsica, after having helped in chasing the Germans from the island, our unit had to re-enter Sardinia, leaving to the French authorities arms, munitions, animals, autos, and various materials, thus rendering themselves practically inefficient.

Requisitioning ultimately impoverished all civilian and military camps, the population and repatriates. Limitations of all kinds were imposed on our military authority regarding their accounting. Italian military were drafted in large numbers, but only to be employed as workmen and for hard labor.

The Italian people who had welcomed the Allies as liberators were soon doomed to suffer many disillusions, and while appreciating the help given in the field of foodstuffs, had with sorrow to support violence on the part of single elements while providing manufacturing facilities and billets which imposed a hardship on numerous families.

Hospitals, sanitoriums, colleges, and schools were from day to day requisitioned and occupied. Factories and other establishments were placed in the impossible position of having their raw material requisitioned and placed at the exclusive use of the allied armies. Valuable furniture and documents, public and private, of inestimable value, were used as fuel for heating in acts of unjustifiable vandalism.

The almost total requisitioning of automobiles, the almost total destruction of railroads, combined to paralize transport.

The great availability of Allied military buying power, and the faborable exchange rate ($ = 100 lira, £ = 400 lira) contributed to increased money circulation with the consequent impoverishment of markets and the raising of

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prices to a highly exaggerated figure.

In conclusion, the AMGOT administration which had acquired such large prestige with the Italians by their efforts to eliminate the unhealthy principles of fascist organization because it had imposed an administrative system on the mentalities and very old Italian traditions (not suited to it), had always recourse to the belligerent elements to sustain it, has ended up by paralizing the civil and economic activities of the liberated zone. This if further aggravated by the fact that it has become necessary in many of the provinces returned to Italian authority to remove many of the officials placed there by the Allies, who have given proof of their incapacity to hold office and many who were dishonest.

The interference in the delicate field of the administration of justice, civil and military, has had grave repercussions.

The consequence of all the above has been a general lowering of morale which has had the effect of creating a choatic situation in the field of political affairs, first due to a feeling of perplexity and then to a distrust of the future.

Any action to effectively re-orient what was left of the Italian army in order to constitute an effective unit was rendered difficult under such conditions.

Nevertheless, superseding difficulties of all nature and taking advantage of the available means, the Italian military authorities went to work and by December 1943 were able, only three months after the Armistice, to organize its first battalion which shed its blood on Monte Lungo, on the flanks of the Allied troops.

From here on, the road towards that goal (rearmament and reconstitution) will be slow and difficult. An Italian division so constituted is ill-equipped for the necessities of modern warfare if it must rely alone on the arms and means of Italian make - if it is to fight alongside the Allies. Recently, the operations of Monte Marrone and Monte Castenuovo were recognized by the Allies.

Another move will soon be made, if the Allies consent and provide the necessary transportation from Sardinia, and allow us to enter the battle line with the new Italian Corps of Liberation, with 15 battallions and 8 groups of artillery for a total of over 20,000 men.

Another contribution which is being made by the Italian army in response to urgent and growing Allied need, is to provide complete units of engineers, services and auxiliaries with a total strength of 100,000 men and an additional 9 other units for another 100,000 men.

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Many of these men have had experience in first-line fighting, not excluding the Ansio beachhead. It is necessary to have the courage to recognize that the qualms and fears of the Allies (towards the Italians) have resulted in the loss of precious time.

Had it not been for this, not one but many Italian divisions could today be in the camp along the flanks of the Allies. It is well to remember in regard to this proposition, that the Allied Command has placed a limit on our total participation in the field of operations of 14,000 men.

A long road must be travelled in order to unite and complete an efficient collaboration in the field of operations which it is the desire of the Italians to accomplish.

The Italian army has the possibility of actively collaborating with the Allies in war operations if there is a change in the Allied conditions by which the Italians are limited.

- Permitting the Italian fighting force to exceed 14,000 men; such a force could soon pass the 20,000 men figure.
- Facilitating the action of our military authorities in carrying out a common program of stabilization with greater freedom of action. (on the part of the Italians)
- Furnishing such arms and materials of which difficiencies exist and which are needed by new units going into combat.

The Italian army finds itself in the preparatory stage for combat employment, the Italian Corps of Liberation, seven or eight divisions, for which it will be necessary in part to have Anglo-American supplies; arms, and means of transport (to scene of action), autos and clothing and equipment.

No difficulties are envisioned with any type of unit; our organizations can overcome them easily. No obstacles of a political character could arise as a result of our increasing our armed forces; our soldier knowing that being in the armed forces they are exclusively serving their country and its old and traditional institutions.

Another condition needed for the realization of this program is for the Allies to reduce in part their request for units of the auxiliary services, parts of which should be absorbed in the Italian army forces, leaving a sufficient margin for the constitution of the 8 divisions and for the territorial military organization.

Another important question which must be resolved is that of the prisoners of war. In spite of the position of a co-belligerent, nothing has been done to change the status of such prisoners. This is incomprehensible to the Italian people and soldiers, especially while the military of the German-occupied zones were held as prisoners in Sicily, Sicilian military were released on parole.

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Consider the inhuman treatment being given Italian prisoners in the hands of the French, without the anglo-American authorities being able to intercede to prevent this state of affairs provoked by the fact that quantities of prisoners captured by the Allies were handed over to the French.

In order to solve the more urgent questions relating to the prisoners, it should be decided to:

a. Define the new status of prisoners in relation to the state of co-belligerency and the status of their employment in order to collaborate more efficiently with the Allies, resolving at the same time the thorny problem of Italian prisoners in Italian hands.

b. Repatriate a quota of personnel necessary to improve and complete the staffing of Italians repatriated in the homeland.

It should be borne in mind that there are at present a large number of our best officers and men in the POW ranks who have benefited by their experience in warfare.

If these men were to be armed, equipped and staffed, one could in no time assign a certain number of units ready to bear arms on Italian soil for the liberation for the liberation of their country. However, no time should be lost and (there should be no loss) of the spiritual forces of these faithful and valiant soldiers in concentration camps.

In the meantime, the "Cuneo" Division (about 8,000 men) has been assembled in Palestine for work after having fought on the British flanks in the Aegean islands.

It must likewise be remembered, that in addition to the Army, the offensive strength of the navy and the Air Force is steadily on the increase.

The Italian navy, rapidly overcoming the inevitable crisis aggravated by the heavy losses due to the Germans' counter-attack, has resumed its missions at the side of the Allied fleet, performing a tenacious silent, precious task which has already received the just appreciation of the Allied Command, an appreciation which could be intensified were the ships now lying idle in Allied ports, released for active duty.

The Air Force, by salvaging and assembling planes in the destroyed and battered fields has, by the heroic efforts of pilots and specialists, been able to assemble about 250 machines - which number corresponds to the near total existing as of the Armistice - and have been operating since the end of September together with the Allies Air Forces.

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However, despite the greatest care, the number of fighting machines diminishes daily, due to the inevitable losses and by lack of equipment, and a large number of pilots and mechanics, desirous of fighting for the liberation of their country, are forced to remain inactive when they could be fighting with Allied equipment. It can be affirmed that on the basis of personnel available, the Italian Air Force could easily man several hundred Allied planes.

As noted above, much has been accomplished, especially if one takes into account the lack of equipment at Italy's disposal, but much more remains to be done and can be achieved if a larger operational contribution could be realized for the Allied cause. In order to do this, however, it is necessary that Italy be given adequate help either in materiel (of the type that has always been lacking) or morally, by understanding that the Italian people are sincerely desirous of collaborating in the war against the Germans, despite their difficult situation.

An initial step in this direction would undoubtedly be accomplished, were the harsh clauses of the Armistice to be revised, thereby handing back to the Italian people their legal and political rights, complete sovreignty and internal independence, with the assistance of the Allies and and Russia. Under such circumstances, Italy could become, in the offensive field, more than a co-belligerent - a real and proper Ally.

It is evident, all things considered, even in the face of the hard struggle, that the above constitutes a common interest for the United Nations and Italy herself.

Compiled by the Supreme Command,

Marshal Giovanni Messe.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

SECRET

10 May 1944

On the morning of 10 May 1944 Colonel C. C. Carter, Commanding OSS-AAI, Colonel M. P. Goodfellow, President of the Board, Colonel E. C. Huntington and Major James H. Angleton, OSS Liaison Officer, AAI, proceeded to Salerno, Italy where they made a call upon Marshal Badoglio.

The Marshal stated that he would like to talk frankly to us as members of General Donovan's organization - as frankly as he and the General - as old friends would talk.

The Italian Government has reached the point where within the next two or three months, it must demonstrate to the people its ability to establish Italy as an Ally rather than a defeated enemy. Failing this, the Government must resign.

There is the alternative of alliance with Russia, but the Marshal does not believe that such an alliance will be beneficial to the Europe of the after-war, nor does he personally want communism in Italy. It must be remembered, however, that the Allies have imposed the existing armistice terms; the Russians have not been party to this; they have sent envoys to Italy to further the cooperation and friendship of a co-belligerent.

Italy has already since the Armistice demonstrated its anti-German sympathies. The Italian Government has equipped and sent to the front 14,000 officers and men. There are another 10,000 ready. In addition, it has preserved intact the greater part of its fleet. It did not permit the sinking of its vessels as was the case with the French. It has at the same time maintained and preserved for Allied use vital ports and communication facilities. It is directing behind enemy lines resistance forces in the North numbering many times those able to fight in the south.

The Italian Government has the following programme under way: the rebuilding of lines of communication and transportation; agricultural rehabilitation and the formation of a fighting force.

A further programme on the part of Italy is dependent in the main on Allied aid and Allied consideration. The Italian people are beaten and disgraced. The Italian spirit can be revitalized only if Italy is released from the straitjacket into which she has been bound by the conditions of the Armistice and is permitted to take her place as a combattant nation beside the United States, England and Russia. She can do much more if given back the prisoners now held and if afforded the necessary equipment. With adequate materiel, eight divisions could be put into the field within a few brief months. In this connection, the Marshal asked why five modern cruisers were retained inactive in the port of Alexandria.

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SECRET

As a matter of fact, the Marshal asked, is it not necessary for the United States from the point of view of its own national interest to build in Italy a strong ally? Americans cannot expect as a race to remain aloof from world problems. We tried isolationism during the last war and failed. We pursued the same policy after the war, but this did not keep us out of the present war. We made a foothold in or near Europe and the Mediterranean is the logical place in which to have our pied-a-terre.

Where in the Mediterranean is a more logical place to build a "strongpoint" than in Italy? We have no bond with Spain and Spain, in fact, is tied to South America. France is too near England not to be obligated to remain her primary ally. There is nothing further East.

Why indeed have we already thrown the Mediterranean to the British? It was ours. We built it and equipped it in the military sense and we have jettisoned its command in order to participate in a costly amphibious invasion against the most heavily defended portion of Europe; against defenses now over three years in preparation. Cold reason would indicate the use of our manpower and materiel to better advantage and at less cost in other areas - the Persian Gulf for example.

All of this, the Marshall said, had been told to General Donovan. He, in turn, had taken a l tter including the foregoing to President Roosevelt. The President had replied most courteously that he was helpless to aid until such time as the Government of Italy had been made democratic and representative. This had now been done. The six leading parties are represented in the present government, which is functioning "as smoothly as an orchestra". The Marshal has now - through an accredited representative - appealed once more to the President. A reply is awaited, but events in Italy will not attend the war. Now, indeed, is the time for the United States to begin to assert its power.

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The following is a report of the trip undertaken in compliance with the orders contained in your cables to me of 8 May and 14 June 1944, and as stated to me in Lieutenant Colonel Toulmin's memoranda of 26 May 1944, copies of which are attached hereto as Appendices A - C.

In the interests of expediency, the report will be made in chronological form. Elaboration on particular subjects will be made as required.

It should be pointed out that the second telegram referred to, which broadened the scope of the mission somewhat, was not delivered to me until I reached Chungking and had already completed part of my trip through India.

1. On 28 May 1944 I departed from Cairo by air, having been held up for several days awaiting permission to enter CBI. The cable granting permission directed me to report to New Delhi before proceeding to Ceylon, which I had intended making my first stop. I therefore proceeded first to New Delhi, arriving there on 31 May 1944.

Before outlining OSS activities, it may add to clarity to outline briefly the theater command organization. Lieutenant General Stilwell commands all American service personnel in China, Burma and India. In no place is he Supreme Commander, however; in China he is Deputy to Chiang Kai Shek; in Burma and India he is Deputy to Mountbatten. Actually he spends his time at Combat HQ in North Burma, directing the Chinese-American campaign there. General HQ, CBI, is now at New Delhi, having been quietly moved from Chungking, and is headed by Major General Sultan, Deputy to General Stilwell, and the real administrative commander of all American personnel in CBI. A Forward Echelon, CBI, has been left in Chungking, but is of relatively little importance.

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British GHQ, India is at New Delhi, but troops participating in the Imphal-Kohima fighting are under command of Lieutenant General Slim, who reports directly to Mountbatten, as does Stilwell as commander of the Chinese-American campaign there.

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander, SEAC, has his HQ at Kandy, Ceylon, with Major General Wedemeyer, USA, as his Deputy Chief of Staff, and several other American officers in staff positions. Brigadier General Frank Merrill represents General Stilwell (and General Sultan) in Kandy in a liaison capacity.

SEAC territory includes Sumatra but not Java; Burma and probably Thailand; no one seems to know the status of French Indo-China.

The 10th Air Force under Major General Davidson has its HQ at Tingkok, North Burma, and operates in Burma; it is part of the Eastern Air Command, a part of the SEAC organization, under Major General Stratemeyer at Calcutta.

The 14th Air Force under Major General Chennault in China theoretically comes under over-all command of Stilwell, as Commanding General, USAF, CBI; the 20th Bomber Command reports directly to General Arnold, in Washington.

The theater command organization is a complex one; General Sultan has recently addressed a letter to the War Department on the difficulties of the situation, and circulated copies of it through HQ, CBI, New Delhi.

The OSS organization is almost equally complex. It may be outlined as follows: working units are located in Ceylon (Detachment 404), North Burma (Detachment 101), Kweilin (AGFTRS), and Chungking (SACO); liaison units are maintained at New Delhi (HQ, CBI) and Shadazup, Burma (Combat HQ); a general service unit is maintained at Calcutta; and a HQ and R&A unit is located at Kunming.

Ceylon is under Lieutenant Colonel Heppner; the other working units are under Colonel Coughlin. Calcutta personnel are under Detachment 101, but by agreement between Colonels Coughlin and Heppner service Ceylon too.

The following is a chart of the OSS organization in the two theaters as it now stands; Lieutenant Colonel Heppner speaks of dissolving Detachment 303 as such, and transferring the personnel to Detachment 404, but the functions would remain the same:



Activities:

SI	SI	Supply &	Admin HQ	SI
SO	SO	Service Base	Liaison	SO
MO	MO	Dist. of Equip.	GHQ	MO
R&A	X-2	&Personnel	USAF	OGs
X-2	R&A	for OSS Units	R&A	R&A
	OGs	X-2	X-2	MU
	Field Photo	R&D(Serv.)		Field Photo
	R&D (Lab)			R&D (Lab)

Commands Served:

USAF	USAF, HQ	All OSS Units	USAF, HQ	SEAC
14th AF	Stilwell	HQ BN. Sec. #2505	OSS Field Units	Eastern Fleet
	Boatner	(Cheeves)	OSS, Washington	
	Merrill	10th AF		
	10th AF	Eastern Air Comd.		
	USAF Field			

The office in New Delhi performs liaison, administrative, service and R&A functions. Lieutenant Colonel Berno handles the first three for Lieutenant Colonel Heppner; while Lieutenant Colonel Berno also seems to be under the impression he acts for CBI units, Lieutenant Colonel Peers denies this, and says that Detachment 101 deals with HQ, CBI, directly. Major Aiken, Detachment 101, travels to New Delhi (and Simla) periodically to confer with

HQ, CBI and British officials (e.g. Government of Burma) on problems concerning Detachment 101. Despite what may seem a lack of centralization, the setup seems to be working satisfactorily.

The R&A unit in New Delhi is dual; part of the personnel belong to SEAC, part to CBI. While this causes some slight difficulty, cooperation of personnel seems good, and the arrangement preferable to the alternatives of having all personnel in a dual status, or under a single R&A chief for both theaters.

The R&A unit for CBI is headed by Captain Joe Spencer, the Chief of the Branch for the theater, and has the biggest staff and files of any R&A unit in the theater. This is because:

a. Security is better than at any place in China;

b. Delhi is the established repository of British intelligence on that part of the world, and the general crossroads for all intelligence flowing out of that area;

c. Work can be done with the British there, without the embarrassment attendant on working with them in China;

d. Reproduction facilities, paper, clerical staff, etc. are available there in greater degree than in China.

The R&A unit in New Delhi for SEAC consists of Lieutenant Mandebaum, the Acting Chief of R&A for the theater being located at Kancy, Ceylon. Captain Spencer and his group (CBI) work on China, Hainan, Formosa, Manchuria, Korea, Japan. They do not really cover the Philippines or the Kuriles. Lieutenant Madebaum (SEAC) works on Burma, Thailand, Malaya, NEI. Spencer and his group help wherever possible.

Spencer maintains liaison with the various intelligence agencies in New Delhi: ISLD, ISTD (Inter Service Topographical Department), EIS (Econ. Intell. Section), SOE, Ministry of Information, JICA, Government of Burma, Translation Section (GHQ), P.O.W. Agencies, etc. In the absence of any SI representative in New Delhi, Captain Spencer maintains the contacts usually handled by SI; so far as I could ascertain, all material collected through this liaison work is forwarded to the Central Information Division of R&A, Washington, none of it being sent through the Reporting Board.

Spencer visualizes being able to move forward to, say, Kunming, in six or eight months, if the Chinese situation develops. Meanwhile, he visualizes the R&A setup for the theater as follows:

a. New Delhi--principal office, under Capt. Spencer;

b. Detachment 101--Lt. Cox, with such assistance as Detachment 101 desires (See later.);

c. Kunming--Capts. Lockwood and Blakemore, working with 14th Air Force;

d. Kweilin--several officers to be sent there, to service AGFTRS as that develops;

e. Chungking--Capt. Weems and several others with SACO; Lt. Stelle in Chungking itself as representative of AGFTRS;

f. Chengtu--it is hoped to place some men there with the 20th Bomber Command;

g. North China--it is hoped to establish a unit at a convenient spot there, as soon as it is possible.

Evidently there are no plans to place any R&A personnel with the Eastern Air Command at Calcutta, or with the 10th Air Force at Tingkok.

Comment on the above R&A units will be made in connection with comments on the various OSS units.

There is no SI representative, or Reports Officer, in New Delhi. There is no apparent need for the former, but one of the latter could probably be well used. Intelligence comes in to HQ, CBI, by Army wireless and pouch from Detachment 101, and is handled automatically. Berne or Spencer can handle the distribution of any intelligence likely to be produced by China or Ceylon in the near future, but a Reports Officer would probably result in more intelligence being obtained by liaison and forwarded to Washington.

Capt. Spencer made clear that he was handicapped in his liaison work by not having material to trade. This led to an impression which later grew; that throughout the Far East, R&A has gone ahead faster and with more personnel than SI, leaving them all along the line in the position of not having original information of their own to trade to others for their information.

There is no X-2 representative in New Delhi at the present time, although Maj. McDonough plans to place one there at the earliest possible moment, and has already arranged for a room for X-2 in HQ, CBI.

Before leaving Delhi, I talked to several members of the staff, HQ, CIB, and to John Davies, political adviser to the staff. The former expressed satisfaction with the OSS setup, and with Lt. Col. Berno's representation. The latter I found the best informed man on OSS on the staff. He felt strongly that OSS had suffered from its first attempts to get started in China, but felt that matters were now on a much sounder basis. He felt that SACO was hopeless and unsound in every way; that AGFTRS was utilizing the best cover possible---the 14th Air Force; that Communist China offered the greatest opportunity for OSS work, but presented an almost insoluble

political problem. He also made clear that in the last analysis Lt. Gen. Stilwell was in no position to oppose any expressed wish by Chiang Kai Shek, and that OSS activities would therefore have to be conducted in such manner as to avoid any protest by Chiang, at the instigation of Tai Li or otherwise.

2. On 6 June 1944 I left New Delhi to proceed to China, having requested permission to proceed to Ceylon but received no answer (it developed subsequently that I had been misinformed by HQ, CBI, and no such permission was required). On arrival at Chabua, Assam, I contacted Lt. Col. Peers, who told me Col. Coughlin was leaving China shortly, so I determined to go to China as quickly as possible, and to visit Detachment 101 later. I was held up 5 days waiting to go over "The Hump", however, and consequently missed Col. Coughlin by one day.

On my arrival in China I found there were OSS activities in three areas,as follows: a general HQ and service depot at Kunming, SACO at Chungking, and AGFTRS at Kweilin. Despite the fact that the Japanese drive had resulted in orders that only combat personnel travel in China, I determined to visit these areas, and was fortunate enough to be able to do so with fair despatch.

3. Kunming has three operations: a headquarters house in town, an R&A unit with the 14th Air Force at its HQ, and a radio station.

The headquarters in town serves as a base office for Col. Coughlin and Lt. Col. Hall, and will serve as such for other top OSS personnel not specifically assigned to SACO, AGFTRS, or other OSS activities. Maj. McCarthy was in charge, carrying on what seemed to me to be mainly service functions, with Capt. Trego, Communications, and Ens. Mykland, Special Funds, both sick.

The principal part of my work there was reading the reports and files on SACO and AGFTRS, which are now being collected in Kunming as the HQ.

The R&A unit is located with the 14th Air Force HQ and is headed by Capts. Lockwood and Blakemore. These officers have definitely established themselves as an integral part of A-2 branch of the 14th Air Force and have now been given quarters with the A-2 branch and are called upon by 14th Air Force officers as a matter of routine. At the same time their work is integrated with R&A work throughout the theater by means of correspondence, and participation in the 8 x 8 card file system set up by Lt. Col. Hall. Capt. Lockwood feels very definitely that their attachment to the 14th Air Force as such, even though it means in a sense absorption by the 14th Air Force, is preferable to a centralized R&A staff at some one location serving all military activities in CBI. Capt. Spencer was in Kunming on a visit from New Delhi while I was there, and seemed thoroughly satisfied with the amount of integration achieved under the present system. There was some discussion as to whether this unit should be placed in AGFTRS, but Capt. Lockwood (and Lt. Col. Hall) were tending towards the opinion that it would be better to leave them in their present position. As will be mentioned later, Lt. Col. Smith desires R&A personnel for AGFTRS in Kweilin, but in any case it would seem preferable to leave Capts. Lockwood and Blakemore with the 14th in Kunming.

The radio station was functioning competently.

A 600-watt transmitter capable to being increased to 1,000 watts was in Kunming. It had not yet been decided whether to place this in the Kunming station or in the AGFTRS station at Kweilin since there was some fear that the latter would have to be evacuated because of the Jap drive.

Before leaving Kunming I also had a long talk with Major Glass, SI officer for French Indo-China. Major Glass had made a report on the Meynier group, in which he stated that Meynier and his wife were able and sincere Allies and explained to me his reasons for thinking so. He expressed the entire situation in terms of a feud between Colonel Emblanc and Commander Meynier, with Emblanc taking the same unreasonable views as to his exercise of French sovereignty that General De Gaulle is sometimes accused of taking. He stated that Commander Meynier had been kicked upstairs to a position as liaison officer for the French Military Mission and that Captain Revol had been put in command of the former Meynier group in Nanning.

As an example of Meynier's cooperation, Glass stated that when Meynier came through Kunming in May he directed the French Military Mission's representative there to turn over to Glass reports from the Meynier group, thus making such reports available to OSS for the first time.

I did not get to talk to Major di Sibour, as he was in Nanning. I did read his first report, which I felt was not very penetrating, but gave a good general survey of the situation. He listed the following intelligence sources in Nanning:

Meynier Group;

Rev. Lang--Christian & Missionary Alliance;

French Military Mission--no representative there;

Gordon-Bernard group--F. Tau;

British SIS--Major Cameron;

French Fathers--Msgr. P. d'Albony, Bishop of Nanning;

Chinese 16th Route Army--General Mah, Chief of Staff;

Tai Li's representative--General Su Kwang Yin.

I do not believe that I got sufficient information, without going to Nanning and talking to additional people, which I did not feel worth while in view of instructions to hurry home, to form a sound opinion as to the Meynier group. My impression was that good faith or no, the group had been rendered virtually impotent by French political squabbles, and that the policy of severing OSS support of them is a wise one. If there is any salvage value there, Maj. di Sibour should obtain it, if he is the right type officer

Nor did I get to see Maj. Smith who was isolated to the south by the monsoon. I did talk to a junior officer who had just come out from him. Maj. Smith has sent out his native assistants and was waiting for their first communications to come in. He was awaiting additional trained personnel, which I found later at 101 just beginning training.

4. On 16 June 1944 I flew to Chungking, proceeding immediately to Forward Echelon HQ, CBI, where with considerable difficulty I found an Assistant Naval Attache who took me to a car going to the SACO encampment outside Chungking, called "Happy Valley".

Both General Tai Li, head of SACO, and Commodore Miles, head of U.S. Navy/SACO, were away on a two months trip to the fighting zones in China. I asked Major Wilkinson, Acting Head of OSS/SACO to report my arrival to General Tai Li's deputy.

I spent the evening, in fact far into the morning, talking with members of OSS/SACO; the following morning I spent calling on members of Navy/SACO, and that afternoon I went into town and called on Lt. Col. Dickey, G-2 Forward Echelon HQ, and Mr. Jack Service, Political Adviser on the staff of Forward Echelon HQ. That evening I spent again with members of OSS/SACO, and the following morning I departed by air to Kweilin with Captain Hykes and 22 of his Chinese students.

Mr. Service presented perhaps the broadest view of China, and probably of OSS. As an "old China hand", Mr. Service shares the pessimism and almost cynicism common to most of those with long experience in China. As to the general state of affairs, he feels that the "Chungking regime" is more interested in keeping itself in power than in fighting the Japanese. After a long war effort on their part, the U.S. has come into the war and said emphatically that we are going to beat the Japs, and the Chinese are quite content to let us do so. Consequently he doesn't feel we are ever going to get much out of the Chinese, in military effort, intelligence, or otherwise.

Mr. Service feels that the Central Government is becoming increasingly totalitarian in temper. As the war drags on and on, the troubles of the Chungking regime continue to pile up, and the regime meets them by constantly tightening their controls--the only way to hold the show together. The Generalissimo is reputed to have become more and more irascible, more and more sensitive to criticism, more and more dictatorial in his methods. Chungking was full of stories as to his relationship to Madame Chiang, and her impending trip to Brazil: one being that as the Chief pro-American figure in the regime, she was in disfavor because of the current criticism in America of the Central Government.

Mr. Service cited two interesting incidents: the first at a recent cocktail party, when two Chinese newspaper women who talked to him were approached afterwards by a household servant, who asked what he had said, and warned them against association too much with him or any other foreigner; and the other in North-West China during a recent trip when he was subjected to constant inspections and interrogations, and finally complained that we didn't treat Chinese in America that way, only to be told that the Russians

handled foreigners that way and the Chinese intended to do so too. Mr. Service felt that emulation of the Russians, as the nearest, strongest and most successful Allied Nation, plays a considerable part in the present totalitarian tendency of the Central Government.

The biggest problem facing the Central Government from the internal political point of view is, of course, the Chinese Communists in the North. Admitting that he is reputed to be pro-Communist, Mr. Service describes them in much the same terms as are used to describe Tito's Partisans--saying that they are controlled by Communist Party members in the key spots, but made up mostly of non-Communists; that they are motivated by desire for social reform, but are not necessarily pawns of the Russians; that they have a unity and strength from their belief which makes them strong opposition to the Japanese; that they would give great cooperation to us, for the sake of the prestige being in touch with us would give them. Stating that no one knows a great deal about them, Mr. Service said his feeling was that they were mainly an agrarian reform movement, seeking to broaden the ownership of the land.

Mr. Service was not optimistic about our chances of working with the Communists. The Central Government has refused all requests for permission to enter Communist territory and work with them, despite two requests to the Generalissimo by the President himself. Mr. Service said the matter was to be discussed again by Mr. Wallace in Chungking, but that they hadn't much hope of a favorable outcome.

As to OSS participation in SACO, Mr. Service feels it is unfortunate for two reasons: first, Tai Li is not interested in Japanese military intelligence, but solely in maintaining the Chungking regime by secret police supervision over all Chinese and all foreigners; and second, that the presence of two American branches within SACO gave the Chinese the opportunity of

playing one off against the other, which he felt they would do to the utmost of their ability. General Tai Li, he said, is not the Admiral Canaris of China, but the Heinrich Himmler; his only interest in SACO is not as a means of developing and utilizing intelligence about the enemy, of controlling American intelligence activities in China. Both because of the traditional Chinese anti-foreigner bias, and the modern simulation of Russian supervision of strangers, Mr. Service feels that this is an established policy of the Chungking regime, and that Tai Li is the man responsible for effectuating it. As to the relative position of OSS and the Miles group, Mr. Service felt that the latter must win out, as long as the "hump" tonnage allowances remain as they are.

Finally, Mr. Service agreed to two points: first, that the Chinese will keep SACO going, to stall the foreigners along and avoid loss of face; second, that General Stilwell cannot risk an open break with the Generalissimo by opposing his wish on any subject. He also agreed that the only way to produce really effective results in China is to settle such matters as intelligence work on the highest level; to let the matter get down to day to day bargaining will inevitably mean that we will lose out.

Lt. Col. Dickey, G-2, Forward Echelon, HQ, impressed me as able, energetic and imaginative; he was friendly, frank, and helpful in his conversations. He too expressed the view that the Chinese are coasting in their war effort, relying on us to accomplish our announced intention of beating the Japanese. He agreed to the restrictive tendencies of the Chungking regime, giving as an example the fact that his houseboy reported to someone by phone each time he enters and leaves his house. As to military intelligence, he says the Chinese are vague, inefficient, not intelligence minded. He says the Chinese can go anyplace they want to in Jap-occupied China, and

that conversely the Japs send their agents into unoccupied China freely. He thinks the Chinese particularly poor at Order of Battle information. They are never precise in their identification, give only the vaguest estimates of total numbers. Despite the fact that the Chinese are usually pretty good in foreseeing the larger developments, he said that the Chinese recently reported that 15 Japanese divisions had been moved from Manhuria, without any advance information of the movement at all; and that a particular Japanese armored division after being reported as located at one place for months, suddenly struck the Chinese by surprise 750 miles to the South.

Col. Dickey pointed out two major military facts: first, that one fourth to one third of the Japanese Army is located on the mainland of Asia, thus providing the largest single concentration of enemy forces for intelligence and operational work; and second, that vast areas of the South East part of China and South East coast, while possibly subject to Jap patrols, are not actually occupied by the Japanese. He felt that the only hope to get accurate information from these areas was by sending American officers there and that the Chinese would undoubtedly betray them to the Japanese; but that other Chinese could be bought or could be hired to give warning of approaching Jap patrols. While losses would be inevitable, he agreed that this would be a most fruitful field for work by young American officers.

Col. Dickey was at first inclined to be critical of OSS intelligence work, quoting an OPD officer who said recently that OSS had been in China for two years without producing anything. When I asked him whether the responsibility was primarily on OSS or Commodore Miles, he agreed it was on the latter. I asked him what OSS could have done and what they could and should do now, putting three alternatives: (1) to push SACO; (2) to

push AGFTRS, and (3) to cut loose from both and drive forward with the whole OSS program under theater control. After some thought and discussion he concluded that the latter would be impossible since it would undoubtedly result in the protest from the Generalissimo which General Stilwell could not oppose. He also concluded that the program now being followed by OSS in China was the best that could possibly be done under the circumstances, and welcomed its continuance. He did state that it was understood that AGFTRS would be transferred from under the 14th Air Force to Theater Command to broaden its function and scope after it has been established and got in running shape.

Col. Dickey stated that from the theater point of view their best intelligence came from the British, particularly from the British Army Aid Group (BAAG). He stated that JICA was not producing much and felt that their organization was basically wrong with the military and naval attaches being ex-officio heads of the JICA Army and Navy Sections.

Throughout American circles generally I found cynicism and pessimism regarding the Chinese. The same point of view is generally held with regard to OSS/SACO. Possibly because I accompanied Capt. Don Hykes, Chief, SI, OSS/SACO, to the front with a fine group of fully trained students I did not entirely share this pessimism. Capt. Hykes is an able officer with several years experience in China, and felt sure that he could place trust and reliance in the students whom he was taking into the field. He had trained them personally for five months and arranged it so that we, not the Chinese, pay them; had told them that if they performed well they would benefit from it after the war; and had arranged for their communications on the basis that the Chinese and ourselves have equal access to their messages. The Jap drive then coming south from Changsha was complicating his problem of getting students into the field, but if they are placed in the field they will be

the first specifically identified Chinese agents of whom we have real concrete knowledge, and their placement should represent a great step forward.

Meanwhile Mr. Peters, Captain Hykes' assistant in SI, was proceeding to recruit another group of Chinese and to train them for a similar program.

Capt. Weems, Chief of the R&A unit, was definitely optimistic about his prospects, although I felt he was trying to sell me an encouraging story rather than be completely objective in his appraisal. He stated that his men now had sufficient periodicals, etc. to keep them busy for two or three months, and that he was, therefore, looking forward to proceeding with several schemes to obtain more books, periodicals and documents from Jap-occupied China.

There is no X-2 representative in SACO and no plans for any so far as I know. Our Colonel Rubenstein had not yet got to China and therefore had not formulated any plans.

I did not get to see Mr. Wu, General Tai Li's deputy, during the short time I was there, except at the airport at departure, at which time he limited himself to formalities. Major Wilkinson said however that they were getting more reports out of the Chinese during the few weeks past than they had during the many months proceeding that SACO had existed. This may be due to the fact that the Chinese were aware of AGFTRS and were giving a little under pressure.

Relations between the Navy and OSS groups in SACO seemed cool but distant. They did not seem to be specifically quarreling but neither group seemed to be particularly helpful to the other. One thing seemed to stand out: The memorandum drawn as a result of General Donovan's visit to SACO provides for a weekly meeting of representatives of the Chinese, the Navy and OSS, at which time various plans and projects are supposed to be co-

ordinated. The meeting is certainly not taking place now, and as near as I could find out no such meeting has ever taken place. Consequently there is no machinery existing to provide cooperation between the Navy and OSS units in SACO.

5. On 18 June 1944 I left Chingking by air and flew to Kweilin, where I spent that and the next four days with Lt. Col. Smith, Commanding Officer of AGFTRS, and Lt. Col. Hall, OSS Intelligence Officer for CBI.

AGFTRS HQ is located in a single hollow-square building off on the side of the Kweilin airfield, commanded by the 29year old Brigadier General "Casey" Vincent of the 14th Air Force. Radio station, offices, and living quarters are all in the same building, which is three or four miles from Kweilin itself.

Lt. Col. Smith is in his early thirties, was born and brought up in China, spoke Chinese before English, and came to the United States only when ready for college. There he entered the University of Michigan, where he soon met Lt. Col. Hall, then a professor of geography there. Col. Smith spent the next ten years at the University, taking a Ph. D. in geography, and studying for a great part of that time under Col. Hall. He obviously has a great respect and friendship for Col. Hall, without kow-towing to him in any respect. After completing his Ph.D., he spent a couple of years teaching in a boy's school and a minor college, and then went into the army.

Col. Smith is nervous and direct. As a student he was the type who quit a class, telling the professor he had come for an education, and was learning nothing from him. I feel sure, however, that his bark is considerably worse than his bite.

AGFTRS is, of course, definitely under the 14th Air Force command. Its genesis was twofold, as I see it; the "good will" item and most of the manpower have been supplied by the 14th Air Force, and the idea and impetus have been supplied by OSS. Lt. Col. Smith and Col. Jesse Williams went out to China as Assistant A-2 and A-2, respectively, of the 14th Air Force in December 1942. Finding almost no intelligence material to work with, they put up a paper for an intelligence organization in the field in January 1943, but were told by the War Department (a) to depend on the Chinese for intelligence, and (b) that so far as a US. effort was concerned, OSS would produce it. They felt the first was not reliable, and couldn't find that the second existed, so in April 1943 sent a liaison officer forward to Changsha with a radio--the start of a system of American liaison officers with radios in the forward areas taken over by and forming the backbone of the present AGFTRS setup. In other words, OSS not being in the field, the 14th was forced into attempting the kind of work OSS should have been doing.

Lt. Col. Smith was when I was in Kweilin in a frame of mind of having been "over-sold" by OSS. He felt that he had been promised more men, money, equipment and support than he was receiving. I'm inclined to believe this is partly due to his own tendency, shared by many in OSS, to let the exciting possibilities of OSS work unduly deepen disappointment at the delays inherent in all such work. In any case it should be pointed out that as an ex-14th Air Force man now commanding a unit of OSS origin, he is in a position to blame everything wrong on OSS, and claim credit for everything right to the 14th. This possibility is enhanced by the arrangement now in effect as to supplies: that AGFTRS has no supply branch of its own but relies on OSS HQ in Kunming for supplies.

As to AGFTRS intelligence work, it is limited almost strictly to combat intelligence for the 14th Air Force--the reporting of fleeting targets, etc. Col. Smith has had no training in anything broader, nor has anyone with him, and as a consequence I felt that he was covering a field far narrower than necessary. This produces some difficulty, too: for example, Lt. Col. Smith is dissatisfied with the OSS radio equipment and communications sytem. He says he does not want any SSTR-1's, but prefers the V-100; and he points out that the schedule-system set up by Capt. Trego is obviously not suited for reporting fleeting targets to be attacked by combat aircraft.

As a result of my observations I felt the AGFTRS is essentially a great step forward, as it presents a chance to do intelligence work under a cloak politically too strong for Tai Li to penetrate, and probably at the same time is forcing Tai Li to loosen his strangle-hold on OSS/SACO, but that the following steps would be desirable:

a. To send out to AGFTRS a Number 2 to Lt. Col. Smith who is both thoroughly acquainted with OSS from top to bottom, and trained in OSS intelligence work in all its phases. (There seems to be no officer now present in the theater with the necessary qualifications.)

b. To bring Lt. Col. Smith back to Washington for thorough indoctrination in OSS as soon as the Number 2 can take over in Kweilin. (Lt. Col. Hall joins in this recommendation.)

c. To move AGFTRS from 14th to Theater Command after it is established and functioning, thus broadening its scope and opportunities, and converting it into a regular OSS unit.

This last step should be easier to achieve with an ex-14th officer commanding, than with an "outsider" from OSS attempting to arrange it. Lt. Col. Smith may soon be in a good frame of mind to sponsor such a move: while AGFTRS is specifically set up not as a part of A-2, but an independent agency under the 14th, Col. Williams (A-2 of the 14th) is continuing to give Lt. Col. Smith and AGFTRS personnel orders in his own rather than General Chennault's name, which is of little importance except that it may create a psychology favorable to such a move as advocated.

Lt. Col. Smith envisages keeping his HQ staff at Kwilin at a bare minimum, and keeping his officers in the field whenever possible. He stated that he wanted only SI and R&A men, until he got considerably further along with AGFTRS. He said he would like to have three R&A men, one Japanese language, one Chinese language, and one general research, and a number of young SI officers (he mentioned particularly Lt. St. Phalle as the type desired, saying it was not necessary that they have China experience) and communicators. He estimated that he could use a dozen such officers, and thirty communicators, the latter to have no strings on them preventing their use in uniform in combat zones. Theater orders now permit 50 officers and 75 enlisted men for AGFTRS, and he believes he can get the allowance raised.

My own feeling is that this is a great opportunity for intelligence work by American officers. As Lt. Col. Dickey emphasized, vast areas of South-East China are not occupied by the Japs, and many combat fronts can be approached far more closely than they have been. Doubtless American personnel would be lost in using them to establish a forward network, but the results would undoubtedly justify any losses. OSS/SACO will almost undoubtedly be limited to working with Tai Li Chinese recruits; OSS/AGFTRS should work with American officers, who can act as informants themselves,

and attempt to develop Chinese recruits from the War Area Commanders, rather than Tai Li and the Central Government.

6. On 23 June 1944 I returned to Kunming and during the day I saw Col. Williams, A-2 of the 14th Air Force, Commander OdenDahl, U. S. Navy Intelligence Liaison Officer with the 14th Air Force, and Mr. Christian, new OSS arrival in China.

Col. Williams confirmed my previous impression of him that he is a hard driving, single-minded man, interested only in intelligence for the 14th Air Force and essentially disliking AGFTRS as being devoted to broader objectives and not directly under his control.

Commander Odendahl's position is somewhat ambiguous: Commodore Miles' Executive Officer, Cmdr. Wight, had told me that Cmdr. OdenDahl was a part of Navy/SACO; Commander OdenDahl told me that he was not a part of Navy/SACO but operating under an independent directive from the Navy Department. In any case his job is to supply intelligence liaison between the Navy and the 14th Air Force. He has several junior officers with him and is working particularly on air target intelligence, plotting of shipping lines, etc.

Mr. Christian had just arrived in Kunming and was staying in the OSS HQ house there. He stated he was not to become a member of OSS/SACO but to operate independently in Chungking. This may perhaps succeed but I cannot help feeling that it may also cause trouble. The agreement with General Tai Li that OSS will do no work outside SACO is still in effect; permission for Mr. Christian to enter China was requested of General Tai Li through Colonel Coughlin, as an open OSS representative; it seems to me that Mr. Christian may very well be summoned and given orders by General Tai Li, as the Head of SACO, to work only within the framework of SACO.

7. On 24 June 1944 I flew from Kunming to Chabua, Assam and the next day drove to Detachment 101 HQ at Nazira. After spending the following day there, on 27 June 1944 I flew by liaison plane to Gen. Stilwell's Combat HQ at Shadazup, Burma where I talked to our representative and to Lt. Col. Stilwell, G-2. On 29 June 1944 I returned to HQ 101, spent that day and the next conferring with Lt. Col. Peers and his staff and making a complete tour of some six or eight of Detachment 101's subsidiary camps.

Detachment 101 is organized on unit rather than OSS lines. The original group was composed solely of officers sent out by SO, and they developed their work as an integrated whole. The work can be summed up briefly as being (a) SI and OG work in support of General Stilwell's Burma Campaign and (b) carried out almost entirely with natives, locally recruited, trained, and operated in the field. Lt. Col. Peers as Commanding Officer spends a good portion of his time traveling between Nazira, Shadazup, Ceylon, New Delhi, etc. Major Hunter is his Deputy in Charge at HQ Nazira; Major Little is his Deputy in Charge at Forward HQ Shadazup. At Shadazup intelligence and operational results are given directly to Lt. Gen. Stilwell and his staff and directives for future work are obtained for transmittal to Nazira. At HQ Nazira the actual work of 101 is directed. The staff there has the usual branch representatives and an Intelligence Officer and an Operations Officer. The present Intelligence Officer, however, serves mainly as a liaison officer and is away from Nazira most of the time. All personnel sent into the field are dispatched and controlled by the Operations Officer, to whom training reports on the progress of all recruits are sent. Field operations are carried on from Field bases and sub-bases

of which there are five principal ones. These sub-bases do a good deal of their own recruiting and training and again give all natives the same training and do not attempt to specialize in their duties or differentiate between detachment and operations.

The results obtained by 101 have been extraordinarily good and valuable, due in a large part to their skillful handling of the natives. This is freely recognized by General Stilwell, and Lt. Col. Stilwell, his G-2, stated flatly to me at Shadazup that Gen. Stilwell could not have waged his Burma campaign without 101. In seeking for possible ways of improvement, my only suggestion would be in broadening the field intelligence coverage. 101's work has been limited pretty strictly to support of Gen. Stilwell's campaign. I believe that good intelligence personnel thoroughly trained in the broadest aspects and methods of intelligence could add strength to the already excellent work being done by 101. That some need for such improvement is felt was shown by the remark of Colonel Hayne, staff officer to Maj. Gen. Sultan, HQ, New Delhi, that 101's intelligence coverage could be broadened to the benefit of HQ CBI.

Lt. Col. Peers was anxious to have a few more R&A personnel. Unless considerably more long range intelligence can be produced, however, I am not sure that there will be sufficient work to justify additional R&A personnel.

Lt. Col. Peers was somewhat unhappy about the X-2 situation thinking that he had been promised considerable personnel to act as SCI units and that none had been forthcoming (Maj. Donough later told me that Lt. Col. Rubenstein had made these promises but that X-2 could not provide the personnel and that in any case that such teams were unsuitable for Burma jungle work.)

Without going into detail I felt that Detachment 101 is a strong, well-functioning organization. Lt. Col. Peers would like several more fairly senior officers of over-all broad ability and sound judgment. I felt several top notch intelligence officers could improve the qulity and scope of their intelligence work. Medically the Detachment is faced with quite a problem and can undoubtedly make excellent use of the hospital facilities they have requested. Otherwise, in supplies, etc. the Detachment is in very good shape.

It should be pointed out that results from 101 in the near future may not equal results in the near past. In the first place, the American advance has changed the location of the main 101 field bases from behind the Japanese lines to behind the American lines. These bases are now being relocated with attendant losses in efficiency. In the second place, the success of 101 has been due largely to cooperation obtained from the Kachins. Kachin country ends at approximately Bhamo-Katha line and south of this line the natives are not so friendly. Consequently, while fine results may be expected to continue from 101 it would be perhaps unfair to expect them to continue the pace they have been setting.

8. On 17 July 1944 I flew to Calcutta where I spent that and the next day.

Calcutta activities are mainly Services, Communications, Counter-Intelligence and recruiting. Lt. Col. McGehee, formerly Services Officer at Algiers, is in Command and in direct charge of all Services Operations. All personnel in Calcutta except X-2 are assigned to Detachment 101 but service equally all OSS activities in China and Ceylon as well. X-2

personnel will be assigned to Lt. Col. Heppner but will be under Lt. Col. McGehee for local administrative and disciplinary purposes.

From my rather cursory observations I should say that Calcutta is efficiently organized and well run. There are several and spacious living and storage facilities: a house used as HQ and senior officers residence, another house used for junior officers, a specially constructed warehouse behind the main HQ, a 36-room all-but-completed Indian prince's house which serves as billet and warehouse for Communications, and a HQ and billet for the recruiting staff under Maj. Coffey. These establishments appeared to me to be well filled with equipment, and without making a specific check, I should say that Calcutta has become a first class supply depot.

The X-2 representatives had not yet arrived when I was in Calcutta but I understand that Maj. White is to be stationed there with one or more assistants. As the refugee center and melting pot of that part of the world, Calcutta presents the greatest field in either area for X-2 work as well as for recruiting.

Recruiting is in charge of Maj. Coffey, a British officer who has lived many years in the Malay Peninsula and India. He is engaged in recruiting natives for both Lt. Col. Peers and Lt. Col. Heppner. He has devised an efficient procedure and seems to know his business. To the usual problems of recruiting he will have added an unusually difficult problem of security.

9. On 3 July 1944 I left Calcutta for Ceylon. I had been running a fever for the preceding few days and on arriving at Bangalore found it had reached 102.5 degrees and consequently had to break my journey there.

After a delay of several days I proceeded to Ceylon on 8 July 1944.

In Ceylon I visited all our establishments: the "reception" and services center in Colombo, the HQ at Kandy, and the training camps at Trincomalee and Galle. I talked to practically every member of the OSS Detachment there and at considerable length to Maj. Gen. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten.

Generalizing, I would say that Lt. Col. Heppner has a fine, fairly small show going there, just on the verge of entering the production stage. The HQ at Kandy are completed and are quite adequate to handle the relatively small staff Col. Heppner plans to keep there. The service arrangements at Colombo seem efficiently organized and adequate to receive supplies for Col. Heppner's Detachment through the port of Colombo rather than Calcutta which has been requested. The Camp at Galle was taken over from a coast artillery battalion and is ready to receive OG's, Students, etc., Maj. Peddicord having made the necessary renovation, installation of new kitchen, etc. The camp at Trincomalee is not quite completed but can handle some students right now on an emergency basis.

Relations with the Theater Command are excellent. Maj. Gen. Wedemeyer lives in the house occupied by Lt. Col. Heppner at OSS HQ, Kandy and is extremely friendly to all OSS personnel. This brings opportunities for contact with the rest of the theater Command; for example, at General Wedemeyer's birthday party at Lt. Col..Heppner's house which was attended by Admiral Mountbatten; Gen. Pownall, Chief of Staff; Lt. Gen. Wheeler, Chief Administrative Officer; Brig. Gen. Frank Merrill, Lt. Gen. Stilwell's representative at Kandy, etc. All OSS activities and all other special and clandestine activities are put through Admiral Mountbatten's staff as a matter of routing through what is called "P" Division. This division is

headed by a British Naval Captain with Lt. Cmdr. Ed Taylor, USNR, as his Deputy, and reports to Gen. Wedemeyer's Deputy for Air. Since Gen. Wedemeyer himself takes a friendly and close interest in OSS activities he, in effect, is the staff officer who has the most to say regarding OSS there. All proposed operations, SI, SO or otherwise, are transmitted to P Division which gives them regular staff treatment and assigns the necessary theater facilities to carry them out as approved, e.g., a submarine. The system seems to work admirably; while the job of American officer in P Division may not be a very exciting one, I should like to stress that to me it seemed an absolutely vital one. This Allied staff section outside either OSS, British SOE, SIS, etc. prevents a great portion of the jockeying and squabbling which is going on in other theaters between these organizations, and in my opinion should be maintained at all costs.

This arrangement seemed satisfactory and in fact the only feasible one. While I was in Ceylon, Col. Hayne visited OSS there as a representative of Maj. Gen. Sultan, Deputy Commander, USAF, CBI. Gen. Sultan evidently felt some concern that an American organization was operating in Ceylon without his knowledge of its details and without reporting through him. Gen. Wedemeyer and Lt. Col. Heppner convinced him I believe that the existing arrangement is sound. A copy of Col. Hayne's report to Gen. Sultan is attached hereto as Appendix D.

The principal operational tools available to OSS/SEAC are submarines of which there has been no shortage as yet. OSS has one small surface craft and a 73-footer is being brought down from Calcutta. Neither of these craft is capable of the long, over-water operations necessary in this area but will serve useful duty as training craft. Aircraft have not

yet been used by OSS in SEAC but should be available through Gen. Stratameyer.

Lt. Col. Heppner has recently established liaison with Gen. Stratameyer and offered to put his organization to work producing information for the Eastern Air Command. While as I say OSS there has not yet reached the productive stage it is on the verge of undertaking productive operations and the needs of the Eastern Air Command are an excellent guide for its efforts.

The principal difficulty of SI work out of Ceylon will be recruits. These are scarce. Some have been sent from the United States and some obtained locally but neither source is prolific. Because of the major expanse of water surrounding them OSS/SEAC cannot simply recruit and utilize natives locally as Detachment 101 does. Recently they have adopted kidnapping as a method of obtaining bodies: a submarine keeps a sharp lookout for a light fishing boat in an area of interest, pops up alongside, takes the natives aboard, sinks the fishing craft, and makes off for Ceylon. This provides OSS with intelligence by interrogation and possible recruits for training and return as agents. So far a surprisingly satisfactory percentage of natives given this treatment have agreed to return. Recruiting work is also being carried on in Calcutta in conjunction with 101 and in Bombay. Every possible aid should be given in the United States.

Miss Cora Dubois, acting head of R&A in Ceylon, was ill when I was there and I did not get to talk to her. I understand from every source that she is doing an excellent job and is very highly regarded. To date original material is rather scarce; the great repository of British material is in New Delhi; if more original material becomes available in Ceylon more R&A personnel could undoubtedly be used there.

X-2 has no representative in Ceylon as yet. Maj. McDonough, head of X-2 in Lt. Col. Heppner's area, was in Ceylon arranging for a permanent representative there however. Since this representative will have to work in the Ceylon scene itself these arrangements were being made with the local British Security officials and were proceeding satisfactorily.

I obtained from Maj. McDonough an outline of X-2 plans for all of Col. Heppner's territory which follows below. It should be noted that Col. Rubenstein is to be stationed at Bombay. This was by arrangement with Lt. Col. Heppner on a purely temporary basis following advice that Lt. Col. Rubenstein was not to go to China. This situation was developing almost daily and a full report has been made to X-2, Washington and will not be repeated here.

The X-2 organization in India and SEAC will have its HQ at New Delhi with offices at GHQ (DMI/DIB) and at 32 Ferozshah Road. Maj. McDonough and J. P. McCarthy will be in charge.

Field stations will be as follows:

a. Calcutta--Major G. H. White;

b. Assam--Major J. T. Patterson en route;

c. Bombay--Lt. Col. S. S. Rubenstein on temporary duty;

d. Karachi--Capt. E. J. Younger en route;

e. Kandy--Personnel en route but not yet assigned.

In order to avoid disputes, all X-2 personnel in India and SEAC will be assigned to Lt. Col. Heppner (Detachment 404) and then placed on detached service at the above field stations. Major Helfrich (Detachment 101) will be Liaison Officer between X-2 India and X-2 China.

X-2 plans to develop a close working relationship with the DMI/DIB, CIC and related branches of the USAF, both at HQ and at the Field Stations, in order to effectively service the Theater Commander with all available current counter-espionage information. Plans for operations in SEAC occupied territories will be based on the information and experience gained from the above operations in India. It is anticipated that things will move slowly.

Two or three officers fluent in the use of Assamese, Bengali, Hindustani, Malay, Tamil or Sinhalese (in that order of priority) will be required for this operation; close reporting from Washington on this operation will be necessary also.

In general, it would seem that OSS in SEAC is faced with two difficulties: one physical and the other psychological. In the first place, they have difficult territory to work and a long stretch of water to get over; in the second place, there is a general feeling that Admiral Mountbatten is not being given very many tools of war and that the real attack against Japan is likely to strike further north leaving SEAC simply to fall like a ripe plum. Lt. Col. Heppner is well aware of this situation and in the face of it has maintained his own and his staff's morale in excellent form. For these reasons, however, he is particularly interested in obtaining from Washington directives as to America's interest in the politics and economics of this part of the world as well as in military matters.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX B

Paraphrase

IN CAIRO (TO DELHI) 14 June 1944

FROM 109 THROUGH TOULMIN
TO McBAINE

(ENC: 141550) TOR 142125
151115

MAGRUDER AND SHEPARDSON FEEL THAT OSS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD DERIVE THE GREAEST BENEFIT IF YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON COULD BE ARRANGED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, AFTER MAKING THE TRIP EAST AS PLANNED, ALTHOUGH WE REALIZE YOUR FUTURE ASSIGNMENT AND SOUTH PACIFIC PLANS ARE STILL PENDING.

A 1. YOU WILL MAKE CAREFUL OBSERVATION OF THE PLANS, REQUIREMENTS, AND CAPABILITIES OF SEAC, CBI, X-2, SI, AND R&A, AND REPORT TO US CONCERNING YOUR EXPERIENCES AND FIRST HAND OBSERVATIONS.

2. CHUNGKING, 101, DELHI, CALCUTTA, AND KANDY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ITINERARY WHICH YOU ARE FOLLOWING.

3. YOU SHOULD GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF 101 IN REGARD TO ALL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY YOU AS THE RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS AND THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING WITH COUGHLIN AND HEPPNER RESPECTIVELY, SHOULD IN REALITY BE JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS.

5. YOU WILL PLEASE INFORM THE C.O. OF EACH OSS UNIT THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE OF YOUR VISIT IS TO ASCERTAIN IN WHAT MANNER WASHINGTON CAN BEST SERVICE AND CARRY OUT THEIR REQUIREMENTS.

B YOU SHOULD ADHERE TO THE ORIGINAL ORDERS INSTRUCTING YOU TO DETERMINE BY WHAT METHODS OSS INTELLIGENCE CAN EFFECT A TIE IN WITH THE US ARMY AND NAVY AS ACTION MOVES FROM THE SOUTHEAST AND EAST.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX C

26 May 1944

TO: Lt. Commander Turner H. MacBaine

FROM: Lt. Colonel J. E. Toulmin, Strategic Services Officer, M.E.

Just prior to leaving Washington I had a conference with General Magruder, who relayed some instructions which he had received from General Donovan for me to give to you prior to your departure for the Far East. They are as follows:

1. It does not seem entirely clear as to the setup of EGFRTS. It would appear from the chart sent on by Colonel Coughlin that this organization might readily be absorbed by the Fourteenth Air Force, and Washington is interested to ascertain whether any additional OSS personnel sent to the Far East would in effect become a part of the Fourteenth Air Force.

2. Inasmuch as communications are quite difficult between Washington and the Far East, you are requested to look into the entire intelligence picture in that sector, including the tripartite agreement which will shortly expire.

3. You are requested to suggest to Colonel Coughlin that his correspondence should be addressed in Washington to the various branch heads rather than to Major Hoffman, who is no longer Far East Theater Officer, having recently become chief of SO.

4. You are to familiarize yourself with the intelligence picture as regards the China coast, including the possible communications system, as it is thought that this will be of definite aid to you in your new position at Pearl Harbor. The General is apparently also interested in your ascertaining the future of the Far East in Chungking as well as any other installation under the command of Colonel Coughlin.

It is my understanding that your trip is for the purpose of ascertaining all up-to-date information on intelligence matters which come under Colonel Coughlin's command and that you are to report your findings and opinions to Washington.

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX D

SUBJECT: Status of OSS units in CBI and SEAC

TO : Deputy Theater Commander, USAF, CBI

Reference the attached memo to Colonel Coughlin, the following facts have been ascertained by conferences with Generals WEDEMEYER, MERRILL and PAPE, Lt. Colonel HEPPNER, and Lt. Comdr. Taylor, USNR, Deputy Chief, "P" Division, SEAC. Paragraph numbers refer to corresponding numbers of DOUGHLIN memo.

1. General DONOVAN agreed to provide SAC with an OSS unit over which SAC would have full operational control, but which would not lose its individuality as an American organization, and would not be integrated with nor placed under the command of any purely British unit. This unit has been designated OSS 404 and up to the present has operated exclusively in SEAC territory. Operational control is exercised through the "P" Division of SEAC HQ, which in turn operates under General Wedemeyer, as Deputy Chief of Staff, SEAC. In actual practice, the CO of OSS 404 (Lt. Colonel HEPPNER), keeps in close touch with General MERRILL on operational matters. Under this arrangement it is considered that American interests, and particularly General STILWELL'S interests, are amply safeguarded. In future, copies of all OSS 404 operational reports will be forwarded to the OSS office at CBI HQ. Aside from the above, and occasional visits of inspection by the officer responsible for coordinating quasi-military units at CBI HQ, no further supervision of 404 by CBI is considered necessary.

For administrative purposes OSS 404 is a part of General WHEELER'S command and clears G-1 and G-2 matters through his headquarters. General WHEELER'S HQ is therefore the administrative link between OSS 404 and CBI HQ.

2. (a) SEAC has the power of veto over any operations in SEAC territory. At present, SEAC has no intention of interfering with any OSS 101 activities in the area covered by CAI tactical operations. If tactical operations should overlap within SEAC territory, SEAC will have the right to decide any questions of areas to be covered by 101 and 404.

(b) SEAC has absolutely no operational control over any OSS unit except 404, with the exception noted above that SEAC may veto any or all operations of OSS units in SEAC territory.

(c) General DONOVAN did not authorize or intend that any OSS units whatsoever be integrated with or controlled by corresponding British units. "P" Division which exercises operational control over 404, is a staff section of SEAC. British units which correspond to OSS are Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Secret Operations Executive (SOE). Both are under the operational control of "P" Division, which coordinates their activities with those of OSS 404. Neither is a part of "P" Division and neither in any way controls OSS 404.

(d) It is intended that OSS operations in North BURMA clear through the "P" Division of SEAC. This is done through General STILWELL'S HQ. "P" Division exercises no positive control over 101, but could veto 101 operations in SEAC territory under SEAC territorial command prerogatives.

(e) It is not intended that Branch heads within OSS deal direct with WASHINGTON. Under the present organization all OSS activities in SEAC are controlled by HQ OSS 404 and deal with WASHINGTON only through that office.

In theory all CBI, OSS units (101, 202, and AGFRTS) should deal with Washington only through Colonel Coughlin's HQ, though this has not yet been fully investigated by the undersigned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31 August 1944

TO : Director's Office

FROM : Major Archie Chun-Ming, M.C.

SUBJECT: Report on Medical Activities, Detachment 101 CBI Theater

In compliance with letter from your office dated 26 May 1944, reference to officers returning from overseas, I am submitting the following report:

I was a member of the original Detachment of 101, which left the United States 28 May 1942 and arrived in Indian on 4 July 1942. From that date to the time of my departure from India on 23 July 1944, I have served as Medical Officer for the detachment. My initial responsibilities included 20 officers and men. At the time of leaving my responsibilities were 89 officers and 227 men and field groups, totalling 4000.

During this period, in addition to my duties as Medical Officer, I have had the opportunity of serving as instructor in many subjects other than medical.

The primary concern of the medical department at all times has been the maintaining of good health of the entire personnel. The following are some of the measures adopted in the carrying out of the foregoing:

A. Anti-malarial Control:

1. This is done by: Screening of quarters, wire screens are used.
2. Inspection of the premises of all quarters and the surrounding area by an anti-malarial squad, and remedying of any unsanitary conditions immediately.
3. Use of motor-oil-kerosene spray on possible mosquito breeding places.
4. Filling and draining of unsanitary spots.
5. Flitting of living quarters at dusk with "Flit" or still better, by the use of aerosal bombs. The latter is especially useful in a tent.

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6. By ussuing instructions to the entire personnel to carry out these regulations:

   a. Must wear long trousers and long sleeve shirts at dusk and at dawn.
   b. Must sleep under a mosquito net.
   c. Must stay indoors during periods of epidemics, whether these be malaria, cholera, or small pox, except, when they are on duty.

B. Mess and Food Control

The Medical Department, in cooperation with the mess officer sees to it that the following are enforced.

1. Kitchens and mess facilities must be kept clean at all times.
2. Personnel handling food are inspected at least, once a week.
3. Food is inspected and must be properly cooked.
4. During epidemics, there is a man assigned to the kitchen to keep tab on the activities there, from the time food is prepared to the time it is put on the tables. Dishes, knives, and forks etc. are placed into a container of boiling water for five minutes before being used. No attempts are made to use the dish cloth to wipe the dishes or forks dry, as the medical department cannot depend on the word of a native that a piece of material is clean.

5. A basin of potassium permanganate solution is placed in each kitchen to insure continuous washing of hands. This is especially important when you consider that natives do not use toilet paper following their latrine. They use their fingers, then wash with water. Imagine a typhoid or cholera carrier doing that during an epidemic!
6. Get after the help as often as you can. This is very important. One must get after them practically all the time, regardless how long they have been employed. Here are two instances: the first case concerned a help whom I caught emptying a bucket of un-boiled water into a container of filtered boiled water for drinking purposes. He knew he did wrong, but he did it just because no one was around.

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The second case concerned a help who toasted the bread. We had taught him how to toast bread over a fire by the manipulation of two forks, so that his hands would not come in contact with the bread. One day I caught him handling the bread with his hands. Not only that, but several slices of toast were on the ground! Time does not permit the enumeration of many similar incidents of native neglect.

I believe the main achievement of the medical department has been the continuous maintainence of the general good health of Detachment 101, inspite of the lack of personnel and other handicaps. During my tenure, three epidemics occured in our area. Cholera broke out among the natives in Oct. 1943; Small pox in March, and the first part April, 1944; and Malaria in June, 1944. We successfully kept the epidemics from our camps through the enforcement of strict measures. Reference to the malaria outbreak, one tea garden (Mackeypore) alone had 300 cases. The other three gardens had a proportionate number. With such a large number of cases in our midst, the medical department was very much concerned. We helped the gardens to the extent of providing anti-malarial drugs, such as, quinine and atabrine as consistent with our supply. Right here I am reminded of the good fortune that was ours, just before Detachment 101 left the United States for overseas. Through the good offices of the Commanding Officer of Secret Operations of the then, Coordinator of Information, who provided us with the necessary money from Special Funds, Detachment 101 was able to secure a very large amount of quinine, a factor which enabled us to provide good anti-malarial care, not only to our men, but in this case, in preventing a spread of an already existing epidemic into our ranks. But for this surplus supply, the general health of 101 may have been quite different.

I believe one of the main difficulties of the Medical Department has been the lack of personnel during the entire time I was Medical Officer. With the already increased strength, and the comtemplated increase, it would be in order that the Medical Department secure as many officers and men as they are able to secure. The exact number can be secured from the present medical officer in charge, Commander James B. Luce, U.S.N.; in connection with the latter, I wish to state that he came to 101 from the Navy eight months ago. He is a very able officer, and is, perhaps, the only Naval Medical Officer who has commanded troops in combat besides doing an equally good job as medical officer. His work has been outstanding, and I am sure that the Medical Department is in very capable hands. I am sure Major Waffle agrees with me.

Since returning from overseas, I have seen and spoken to members of the Medical Department. I have spent considerable

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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PROCUREMENT STATUS OF OSS SPECIAL ITEMS

1 March 1944

Paper Parachute
A small paper device for dropping package of 25 lbs. Commercial item. Can obtain promptly.

Turtle Egg
Will be available March 15th.

Thermit Well
Available from stock.

Altimeter Switch
In production. We will have in stock before March 20th.

Cap, blasting
Available from stock.

Clams
Available from stock.

Delay Mechanism, Clockwork
Available from stock.

Diving Equipment
Sixty day delivery.

Equipment, Lockpicking
Available from stock.

Firing Device, delay type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, pressure type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, pull type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, release type
Available from stock.

Fog Signal
Small quantity in stock.

Fuse Igniter, pull wire
Available from stock.

Incendiaries, pocket time
Available from stock.

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HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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Limpets
Available from stock.

Magazine Caps
Available from stock.

Magnetic Holdfasts
Available March 15th.

Magnet
Available from stock.

Silenced Pistol
Available from stock.

Switch road
Available from British SOE.

Torch
Standard commercial item.

Booby trap wire
For use with booby traps. 20,000 spools on hand.

Tablets "K"
Knock-out drops. Demand negligible. Can supply.

Tablets "L"
Sudden poison. Obtain from British SOE. 100 on hand.

Tablets, Benzedrine
Available. Small stock on hand.

Kit, Medical, Universal
On hand.

Gun, Stinger
Available from stock.

Knives, fighting
Available.

Bags, lefoten
Intend to use standard Army item. When ordering specify -"Bag, clothing, waterproof."

Cosh, spring
Collapsible club. 5,000 on hand.

Smatchets
Modified cleaver. 4,000 on hand.

Climbers, tree
Using standard QMC climber.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

(34814)

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<u>Compound, cap sealing</u>
Standard commercial item.

<u>Fireflies</u>
Will have 3,000 in stock by March 15th.

<u>Press X</u>
Total order of 100 will be delivered by April 1st.

<u>Photostat, Zeller, Portable</u>
200 under procurement. Delivery will start about April 1st.

<u>Dog Drag</u>
400 in production. Deliveries will start March 10th.

7.1 Millard P. Goodfellow

1944

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

To Col. Goodfellow

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Colonel Chas. Sears DATE: 24 January 1944

FROM : Lt. T. Bolton

SUBJECT: Lend-Lease Procurement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. In response to your memorandum of January 21 to Mr. W. M. Mayo, there are attached hereto two (2) copies of Administrative Memorandum No. S-110, dated 10 December 1943, for Colonel Goodfellow and Colonel Rehm.

2. Lend-Lease procurement outlined in the attached memorandum is extremely simple and experience so far indicates that it will work quite well.

3. It was suggested in your memorandum that we outline a typical operation under this new system, such as Pencils for the British.

a. After we have been definitely notified as to British requirements for Pencils, and after initial clearance through the Corps of Engineers has been obtained for the production of Pencils, the dollar value of the over-all contract of British requirements is submitted to the International Division, Army Service Forces, for approval under Lend-Lease.

b. When approval has been obtained from the International Division, a Procurement Directive is issued to the appropriate Technical Service of the Army (such as Engineers, Chemical Warfare, Air Corps, etc.).

c. The Technical Service will then issue an Allotment Advice covering funds to be made available for the procurement in question, and Allotment Advice is forwarded to the O.S.S., Attention: Finance Branch. The Finance Branch has in effect a set of books which they keep in connection with each transaction. Upon receipt of the Allotment Advice the O.S.S. is then in a position to make a contract with various firms for the production of the required items.

d. At the time the Procurement Directive is issued by the International Division, a Sequence Record Number is also issued, thereby authorizing the transfer and exportation of the items to be procured from the U.S.A. In the past O.S.S. has encountered much difficulty in obtaining authority to transfer various items to the British and then for the British to get them out of the country. This was due to the fact that O.S.S. did not possess an Export License and had no authority under the Lend-Lease Act to procure and transfer.

e. As soon as items produced under contract are completed and ready to go forward, the O.S.S. will notify the Technical Service issuing the Allotment Advice and transportation thereafter will be handled by the Technical Service.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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f. The manufacturer submits his invoice and bill of charges directly to the O.S.S., and the Finance Branch (O.S.S.) prepares and audits a voucher which is then submitted to the Finance Officer of the War Department for payment. Complete financial files covering each Lend-Lease transaction are retained in the Finance Branch. As stated in paragraph 9 of Administrative Memorandum No. S-110, monthly reports will be submitted to the Technical Service covering the status of allotments made to O.S.S.

g. As stated above, experience to date indicates that this is a very workable procedure and that we shall have little difficulty in streamlining our operations under this system.

For the Chief, Procurement and Supply Branch.

Tom Bolton

TOM BOLTON
1st Lt., AC
International Officer
International Division
Procurement and Supply Branch.

TB:mw
Enclosure

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

7.1 Millard P. Goodfellow

1944

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

12 January 1944

TO: Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

SUBJECT: Current Status of OSS Special Items

Herewith is the latest tabulation of the procurement status of OSS Special Items, together with an analysis showing the weight and cubage of these items. This analysis will assist you in preparing requisitions and securing Theater Commander Approval for shipments.

C. M. SEARS, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Services

Attachments-2

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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PROCUREMENT STATUS OF OSS SPECIAL ITEMS

10 January 1944

Paper Parachute
A small paper device for dropping packages of 25 lbs. Commercial item. Can obtain promptly.

Cacolub, Discs
Supplanted by the "Turtle Egg". A thin rubber container containing ingredients to ruin an automobile engine. 50,000 under procurement. It has been found necessary to change specifications and it will be 15 February before revised model will be in stock.

Thermit Well
1,000 have been made. User trials were successful. The device is used to destroy machinery. Available from stock.

Altimeter Switch
To blow up an airplane at a given altitude. An experimental order for 1,000 has been placed and the scientists have approved design and samples. Not available before 1 February.

Cap, blasting
Used to detonate plastic explosive. Is now a standard engineer's item and available in quantity.

Clams
Used to blow up vehicles and will penetrate light armor. Available from stock.

Delay Mechanism, Clockwork
For use as a fuse on limpets where exact timing is desired. Slight demand. 550 on order. 50 delivered - balance 1 March.

Diving Equipment
30 sets delivered but have been allocated. Further deliveries require 60 days.

Equipment, lockpicking
150 sets on hand. Commercial item. Can obtain promptly.

Explosive, Aunt Jemima
Camouflaged explosive. 30,000 procured and delivered to Navy. No further procurement planned.

Firing Device, delay type
A delay type fuse for P. E. Now in production. Available.

Firing Device, pressure type
For booby traps. 50,000 in production. Available from stock.

Firing Device, pull type
For booby traps. 50,000 in production. Available from stock.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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Firing Device, release type
For booby traps. 50,000 in production. Available from stock.

Fog Signal
Explosive fuse for railroad tracks. Reasonable quantity in stock.

Fuse Igniter, pull wire
Standard commercial item. Available in any quantity.

Incendiaries, pocket time
Delay action device for starting fires. Available.

Limpets and limpet delays
In production and available. A device to attach to a ship below waterline and explode by delay action fuse. 12,500 on order. Available.

Magazine Cap
Small plastic container for blasting caps. Stock on hand - 14,000.

Magnetic Holdfasts
1,500 under procurement. To enable a swimmer to hold himself at the side of a ship while attaching a limpet.

Magnet
Used to attach explosive charges to a metal surface. 5,000 on hand. 25,000 on order.

Silencer
1,500 .22 caliber pistols on requisition. Available.

Switch, road
The English tyreburster to blow off a wheel on contact. Available from British SOE. 6,000 on order.

Torch
Standard commercial item.

Booby trap wire
For use with booby traps. 20,000 spools on hand.

Tablets "K"
Knock-out drops. Demand negligible. Can supply.

Tablets "L"
Sudden poison. Obtain from British SOE. 100 on hand.

Tablets, Benzedrine
Available. Small stock on hand.

Kit, Medical, Universal
On hand.

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HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

Gun Stinger
.22 caliber pencil pistol. 25,000 under procurement. Available.

Knives, fighting
10,000 on hand.

Bags, lefoten
For carrying demolition equipment. 14,000 of one standard type under procurement.

Cosh, spring
Collapsible club. 5,000 on hand.

Smatchets
Modified cleaver. 4,000 on hand.

Climbers, tree
Using standard QMC climber.

Compound, cap sealing
Standard commercial item.

Fireflies
Fuel tank igniter. Available 15 February. 100,000 under procurement.

Hedy Lamarr
A device for creating panic, simulating the noise of a falling bomb and the resulting explosion. 5,000 under procurement. Available 15 February.

Press X
A small press for agents in the field. Prints 6" x 9". 100 under procurement. Will weigh under 20 pounds. Available about 15 March.

Photostat, Zeller, Portable
Small compact device for reproducing documents up to 9" x 11". 200 under procurement. Available approximately 1 March.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

7.1 Millard P. Goodfellow

2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS

1944

Millard P. Goodfellow

2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS

1944

12 January 1944

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OSS ITEMS

WEIGHT AND CUBAGE

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ard P. Goodfellow

2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS

ITEM	Estimated Packing: UNIT	Estimated Packing: WEIGHT	Estimated Packing: CUBAGE	Suggested Standard Packing: UNITS	Suggested Standard Packing: WEIGHT	Suggested Standard Packing: CUBAGE
Paper Parachute, each	1	1½ lbs.	528 cu. in.	100	150 lbs.	30.5556 cu. ft.
Caccolub, Discs - Supplanted by "Turtle Egg"						
Turtle Egg, each	1	30 grams	3 cu. in.	1,000	66.1312 lbs.	1.7361 cu. ft.
Capsules, Incendiary - Discontinued						
Cigarettes, Incendiary - Discontinued						
Thermite Well						
Small, each	1	1 lb.	15 cu. in.	100	100 lbs.	.8680 cu. ft.
Large, each	1	3 lbs.	80 cu. in.	100	300 lbs.	4.6296 cu. ft.
Altimeter Switch (without charge), each	1	½ lb.	14.25 cu. in.	100	50 lbs.	.8246 cu. ft.
Cap, blasting, each	1	50 grams	.149 cu. in.	1,000	110.2 lbs.	.0862 cu. ft.
Clams, each	1	3/4 lbs.	20.635 cu. in.	100	75 lbs.	1.1941 cu. ft.
Delay Mechanism, clockwork, each	1	1/4 lbs.	18 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	1.0416 cu. ft.
Diving Equipment, each	1	62 lbs.	4.5 cu. ft.	10	620 lbs.	45.0000 cu. ft.
Equipment, lockpicking, each	1	1 lb.	48 cu. in.	100	100 lbs.	2.7777 cu. ft.
Camouflage Explosive, Aunt Jemima, box	1	50 lbs.	2.2222 cu. ft.	10	500 lbs.	22.2220 cu. ft.
Firing Device, pull type, each	1	1/4 lb.	.4375 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	.0253 cu. ft.
2/box	1	1/2 lb.	7.0937 cu. in.	100	50 lbs.	.4105 cu. ft.
Firing Device, delay type, each	1	5/8 lb.	5 cu. in.	100	62½ lbs.	.2893 cu. ft.
Firing Device, pressure type, each	1	1/2 lb.	2.8125 cu. in.	100	50 lbs.	.1627 cu. ft.
2/box	1	1 lb.	11.1562 cu. in.	100	100 lbs.	.6456 cu. ft.
Firing Device, release type, each	1	1/4 lb.	1.2109 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	.0700 cu. ft.
2/box	1	1/2 lb.	7.0937 cu. in	100	50 lbs.	.4105 cu. ft.
Fog Signal, each	1	1/4 lb	11.8125 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	.6836 cu. ft.
2/box	1	1/2 lb.	25 cu. in.	100	50 lbs.	1.4468 cu. ft.

d P. Goodfellow 1944

2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS

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ITEM	UNIT	ESTIMATED PACKING WEIGHT	ESTIMATED PACKING CUBAGE	SUGGESTED STANDARD PACKING UNITS	SUGGESTED STANDARD PACKING WEIGHT	SUGGESTED STANDARD PACKING CUBAGE
Fuse Igniter, pull wire, each	1	10 grams	.9843 cu. in.	1,000	22.05 lbs.	.5690 cu. ft.
Incendiary, pocket time, each	1	5/8 lb.	10.25 cu. in.	100	62½ lbs.	.5930 cu. ft.
Limpet, each	1	11 lbs.	295.3125 cu. in.	50	550 lbs.	8.5450 cu. ft.
Limpet Delay, each	1	5/8 lb.	5 cu. in.	100	62½ lbs.	.2897 cu. ft.
Magazine Cap, each	1	1/4 lb.	4.375 cu. in.	1,000	250 lbs.	2.5318 cu. ft.
Magnetic Holdfasts, each	1	7 3/4 lbs.	151.3062 cu. in.	50	387½ lbs.	4.3787 cu. ft.
Magnet, each	1	1 lb.	5 cu. in.	100	100 lbs.	.2897 cu. ft.
Silencer, each	1	1/4 lb.	9.808 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	.5675 cu. ft.
Attached to Pistol (combined weight), each	1	2½ lbs.	82.6718 cu. in.	100	250 lbs.	4.7842 cu. ft.
Switch, Road (type buster), each	1	5 ounces	6 cu. in.	100	31.125 lbs.	.3472 cu. ft.
Torch, cutting, underwater - Never Ordered, not available						
Booby-Trap Wire, spool	1	3/4 lb.	1.512 cu. in.	100	75 lbs.	.0875 cu. ft.
Tablets "K", tube of 20, each	1	1/16 lb.	1.92 cu. in.	1,000	62½ lbs.	1.1111 cu. ft.
Tablets "L", tube of 10, each	1	1/16 lb.	1.92 cu. in.	100	6½ lbs.	.1111 cu. ft.
Tablets, Bunzedrine, 25/bottle, 12 bottles/pkg.	1	1 3/8 lbs.	40.4687 cu. in.	100	137½ lbs.	2.3413 cu. ft.
Kit, Medical, Universal (6 Month) each	1	6 lbs.	468.6687 cu. in.	50	300 lbs.	13.5610 cu. ft.
Sun Stinger, each	1	100 grams	.8125 cu. in.	1,000	220.4 lbs.	.4701 cu. ft.
Knives, fighting, each	1	3/4 lb.	37.725 cu. in.	100	75 lbs.	2.1831 cu. ft.
Gun, Silent, Arrow, each	1	3 lbs.	196.625 cu. in.	50	150 lbs.	5.6898 cu. ft.
Bags, Lefoten (folded), each	1	1 1/4 lbs.	86.625 cu. in.	100	125 lbs.	5.0130 cu. ft.
Cosh, Spring, each	1	5/8 lb.	12.4609 cu. in.	100	62½ lbs.	.7211 cu. ft.

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lard P. Goodfellow 1944

2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS

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ITEM	ESTIMATED PACKING UNIT	WEIGHT	CUBAGE	SUGGESTED STANDARD PACKING UNITS	WEIGHT	CUBAGE
Smatchets, each	1	2 lbs.	69.0937 cu. in.	100	200 lbs.	3.9984 cu. ft.
Climbers, tree, each	1	1 lb.	150 cu. in.	100	100 lbs.	8.6805 cu. ft.
Compound, cap sealing, 1 pint cans, can	1	.6 lb.	54 cu. in.	100	60 lbs.	3.1250 cu. ft.
Knuckle Dusters, each	1	3/8 lb.	66.40625 cu. in.	100	37.5 lbs.	3.8429 cu. ft.
Fireflies, each	1	1/4 lb.	7.3125 cu. in.	100	25 lbs.	.4231 cu. ft.

7.1 Millard P. Goodfellow
2024 RELEASE OF RECORDS
1944

Col. Goodfellow

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

5 February 1944

TO: All concerned

SUBJECT: Procurement Status of OSS Special Items

Attached hereto, for your information, is the latest tabulation of the procurement status of OSS Special Items.

C. M. SEARS, JR.
Lt. Colonel, AUS
Chief, Services

Attachment

HOOVER INSTITUTION

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

SECRET

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2003/02/01 HIA-GOODFELLOW-3-B-7-7-3

PROCUREMENT STATUS OF OSS SPECIAL ITEMS

1 February 1944

Paper Parachute
A small paper device for dropping packages of 25 lbs. Commercial item. Can obtain promptly.

Turtle Egg
Expect to have stock available 20 February.

Thermit Well
Available from stock.

Altimeter Switch
Production on 1,000 starts 15 February and should be completed 1 March. User trials have not been made.

Cap, blasting
Available from stock.

Clams
Available from stock.

Delay Mechanism, Clockwork
User trials being made. 500 available about 1 March.

Diving Equipment
Sixty day delivery.

Equipment, lockpicking
Available from stock.

Firing Device, delay type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, pressure type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, pull type
Available from stock.

Firing Device, release type
Available from stock.

Fog Signal
Small quantity in stock.

Fuse Igniter, pull wire
Available from stock.

Incendiaries, pocket time
Available from stock.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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Limpets
Available from stock.

Magazine Caps
Available from stock.

Magnetic Holdfasts
Available about 1 March.

Magnet
Available from stock.

Silenced Pistol
Available from stock.

Switch, road
Available from British SOE.

Torch
Standard commercial item.

Booby trap wire
For use with booby traps. 20,000 spools on hand.

Tablets "K"
Knock-out drops. Demand negligible. Can supply.

Tablets "L"
Sudden poison. Obtain from British SOE. 100 on hand.

Tablets, Benzedrine
Available. Small stock on hand.

Kit, Medical, Universal
On hand.

Gun Stinger
Available from stock.

Knives, fighting
Available.

Bags, lefoten
Intend to use standard Army item. When ordering specify - "Bag, clothing, waterproof".

Cosh, spring
Collapsible club. 5,000 on hand.

Smatchets
Modified cleaver. 4,000 on hand.

Climbers, tree
Using standard QMC climber.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES

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<u>Compound, cap sealing</u>
Standard commercial item.

<u>Fireflies</u>
Specifications have been changed and will not be in stock before 15 March.

<u>Hedy Lamarr</u>
It is now planned to use a standard commercial item available from stock.

<u>Press X</u>
Five will be available last week in February. Thereafter 20 a week.

<u>Photostat, Zeller, Portable</u>
Available about 15 March.

<u>Dog Drag</u>
A device to destroy a dog's sense of smell. Plan to procure 400. Available about 15 March.

HOOVER INST. ARCHIVES